here - Center on International Cooperation - New York University

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1.3 AS A MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF PUBLIC TENDERING/PROCUREMENT PROCESSES
1.3.1 SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT BOLSTERING THE RESILIENCE OF NATIONAL PROCUREMENT BODIES, PARTICULARLY WHERE THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE OF
MONOPOLY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS BY ILLICIT ACTORS, OR POLITICAL ACTORS USING PUBLIC CONTRACTS AS LEVERAGE TO SECURE THE SUPPORT OF
CRIMINAL GROUPS FOR LEVERAGING VOTER TURNOUT OR OTHER POLITICAL ENDS.
1.3.2 SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT GUARANTEEING TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESSES, FOR EXAMPLE BY SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENT
AND PASSAGE OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION BILLS, SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO REGULARLY PUBLISH INFORMATION RELATED TO PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND
CONTRACTING PROCESSES, AND SUPPORTING CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON THESE PROCESSES. THE SUPPORT OF
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES SHOULD BE LEVERAGED TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EASILY ACCESSIBLE AND NIMBLE MONITORING TOOLS. EXPERIENCES CAN
BE DRAWN FROM SMART APPROACHES ALREADY IN PLACE SUCH AS IPAIDABRIBE.COM.
1.3.3 STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES BY ENHANCING SKILLS AND SUPPORTING REFORM OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS.
2. MODERNIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
2.1 SUPPORT THE STRENGTHENING OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES SUCH AS THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED CRIME UNITS. ENSURING STRICT AND CONTINUOUS VETTING PROCEDURES IN RECRUITMENT AND PERFORMANCE REVIEW
PROCESSES AS WELL POST ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR THEMSELVES AND FAMILY MEMBERS CAN HELP SAFEGUARD THESE UNITS FROM
CORRUPTION, MANIPULATION, AND INTERFERENCE, AND PREVENT INDIVIDUAL OPERATORS FROM GOING ROGUE.
2.2 IN CASES WHERE IT IS EVIDENT THAT CRIMINALS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN PROVIDING SERVICES TO CITIZENS, SPECIALIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
SHOULD WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH DEVELOPMENT ACTORS AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES TO FILL THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC VOID LEFT BY SUCCESSFUL LAW
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS. CITIZEN SECURITY EXPERIENCES FROM BRAZIL’S FAVELAS OR JAMAICA’S GARRISON TOWNS CAN BE EXPLORED FOR THIS PURPOSE,
BUT LOCAL CONTEXT SHOULD DRIVE THE RESPONSE AS VIOLENCE IS NOT ALWAYS THE LOGICAL OUTCOME OF THE VOID AND THEREFORE IMPACT CAN BE MORE
DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE.
2.3 USE POLITICAL ECONOMY ASSESSMENT TOOLS (SEE SECTION III) MORE EFFECTIVELY TO DEEPEN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ELITES
PROVIDE ENTRY POINTS FOR ORGANIZED CRIMINALS AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE (POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL, FINANCIAL), AND TO IDENTIFY TARGETED LAW
ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES THAT RAISE THE BUSINESS AND POLITICAL COSTS OF ENGAGING IN ILLICIT ACTIVITY.
2.4 INVOLVE THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN POLICY DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES REGARDING HOW TO COMBAT ORGANIZED CRIME, AND SUPPORT LEARNING FROM
OTHER EXPERIENCES SUCH AS THE BUSINESS AGAINST CRIME OF SOUTH AFRICA (BAC(SA)) INITIATIVE. BAC(SA)’S ORIGINAL PURPOSE WAS TO WORK WITH
THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ON SPECIFIC CRIME PREVENTION PROJECTS THAT IMPACTED ON THE COUNTRY’S TRANSFORMATION BY INCREASING
CONFIDENCE, INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION. IT IS STILL ACTIVE TODAY FOCUSING ON ELIMINATING CRIME WITHIN BUSINESS AND SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT
RESPONSES TO CRIME.
NYU
CIC
Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries