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232<br />
year rather than the need to deal with pernicious c<strong>on</strong>tacts<br />
between organized crime figures and politicians. Acti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
taken by the government in the 12 m<strong>on</strong>ths following the<br />
September 2012 electi<strong>on</strong>s will be an indicator of whether<br />
the government will seek to address any of these issues in<br />
the short-term.<br />
1. D<strong>on</strong>ors should help strengthen accountability<br />
processes. At present, the primary source of accountability<br />
in the Jamaican political system is foreign governments.<br />
Transparency, answerability, and enforcement need<br />
to be enhanced. D<strong>on</strong>ors should focus <strong>on</strong> vertical<br />
accountability, including electoral accountability and<br />
the way in which n<strong>on</strong>-state actors, such as media and<br />
civil society organizati<strong>on</strong>s, reflect citizens’ views as well as<br />
c<strong>on</strong>cerns. The centrality of the state in nati<strong>on</strong>al political<br />
life and its dominati<strong>on</strong> over the past seventy years by<br />
two highly compromised political parties often locked in<br />
mortal battle with <strong>on</strong>e another has led to Jamaica having<br />
an extremely weak civil society that has had little success<br />
in providing a real check <strong>on</strong> the political parties.<br />
Emphasis should also be <strong>on</strong> horiz<strong>on</strong>tal accountability, or<br />
how intra-governmental mechanisms can be improved<br />
(for instance, the judiciary and supreme audit instituti<strong>on</strong>s).<br />
Here, the c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of power in the hands of party<br />
leadership and the Parliament has also prevented the<br />
emergence of real accountability. D<strong>on</strong>ors should work<br />
with the Jamaican political elite and other relevant<br />
stakeholders to define good practices and hold them to<br />
account against clear, measurable targets.<br />
The engagement of a wide range of domestic actors at<br />
the sub-nati<strong>on</strong>al level, such as parliamentarians, audit<br />
instituti<strong>on</strong>s, local civil society, and the private sector in<br />
these efforts is imperative. D<strong>on</strong>ors could facilitate debates<br />
about development priorities to ensure alignment and<br />
encourage stakeholders to engage more actively in<br />
m<strong>on</strong>itoring and evaluati<strong>on</strong> processes. Given the prevalence<br />
of political-criminal ties in Jamaica, more emphasis should<br />
be placed <strong>on</strong> making publicly available data regarding the<br />
disbursement, management, and impact of development<br />
funds.<br />
Well-defined sancti<strong>on</strong>s for poor performance or<br />
siph<strong>on</strong>ing of funds should be developed. At the same<br />
time, d<strong>on</strong>ors should collaborate with civil society bodies<br />
to inform citizens about the c<strong>on</strong>sequences of criminal<br />
activities, such as acting as drug couriers for organized<br />
criminal groups. Alternative income opportunities, for<br />
instance microfinance schemes, need to be promoted,<br />
especially in urban areas with the greatest need. So far,<br />
civil society does an extremely poor job penetrating the<br />
poorest neighborhoods. The most powerful civic actors<br />
t<str<strong>on</strong>g>here</str<strong>on</strong>g> are often politically c<strong>on</strong>nected criminal groups.<br />
In a similar vein, d<strong>on</strong>ors should step up their efforts to<br />
support state and n<strong>on</strong>-state actors in carrying out<br />
anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> initiatives. Jamaica has a relatively<br />
comprehensive anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> framework. In 1986, then<br />
Prime Minister Edward Seaga set up the office of the<br />
C<strong>on</strong>tractor General, 66 which seeks to protect the integrity<br />
of the public procurement system. More recently, the<br />
Corrupti<strong>on</strong> Preventi<strong>on</strong> Act (2001) was passed, establishing<br />
the Commissi<strong>on</strong> for the Preventi<strong>on</strong> of Corrupti<strong>on</strong>. The<br />
Access to Informati<strong>on</strong> Act and Political Code of C<strong>on</strong>duct<br />
further c<strong>on</strong>tain the potential to fight corrupti<strong>on</strong>. Yet,<br />
in practice, anti-corrupti<strong>on</strong> measures remain grossly<br />
inadequate. 67 Vested interests in sustaining corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
within the political and business elite, organized crime,<br />
and bureaucracy have crippled efforts to attack the<br />
broader culture of mismanagement and impunity.<br />
Jamaica’s “untouchables” c<strong>on</strong>tinue to be out of reach<br />
for prosecuti<strong>on</strong>. Calls for a single, independent anticorrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
agency remain unanswered. Not a few efforts,<br />
while well intenti<strong>on</strong>ed, flounder for inacti<strong>on</strong> and lack of<br />
follow-through. While in many areas t<str<strong>on</strong>g>here</str<strong>on</strong>g> is no lack for<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>al reports by specialists, <strong>on</strong>e key challenge is to<br />
move implementati<strong>on</strong> forward, particularly transparency<br />
initiatives in electi<strong>on</strong>s and ec<strong>on</strong>omy.<br />
2. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, significant support should be channeled<br />
towards strengthening the justice system and<br />
66. A major failing of the positi<strong>on</strong> of C<strong>on</strong>tractor General is that the office holder cannot prosecute<br />
corrupti<strong>on</strong> or other criminal offences himself. Instead, all matters must be transferred to the<br />
appropriate state authorities, including the Jamaica C<strong>on</strong>stabulary Force (JCF) and the Director<br />
of Public Prosecuti<strong>on</strong> (DPP), rendering the process vulnerable to interference and obstructi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
67. In February 2011, the Jamaica Gleaner <strong>New</strong>spaper revealed that the Corrupti<strong>on</strong> Preventi<strong>on</strong><br />
Commissi<strong>on</strong> (established in 2000) referred more than 18,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s to the director of public<br />
prosecuti<strong>on</strong> (DPP) for breaches of the Corrupti<strong>on</strong> Preventi<strong>on</strong> Act (2001). Of this number, so far<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly 512 have been acted up<strong>on</strong> by the DPP. See: “Anti-Corrupti<strong>on</strong> Body Dissatisfied with DPP,”<br />
Jamaica Gleaner, February 18, 2011, available at: http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110218/<br />
news/news5.html.<br />
NYU<br />
CIC<br />
Resp<strong>on</strong>ding to the Impact of Organized Crime <strong>on</strong> Developing Countries