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Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar. Development
strategies in this scenario will require finding ways to:
a) strengthen local institutions without fracturing the
underlying political settlement; b) neutralize or integrate
politically and economically powerful local actors into the
overall political settlement, without incentivizing further
criminal activity; and c) achieving effective and efficient
development interventions without violating basic
development principles such as do no harm or supporting
activity that violates human rights or international law.
Since enclave scenarios involve a delicate balance of power
between the center and local enclaves, development
strategies should also anticipate overt confrontation
between political actors, and moments of crisis or even
organized violence. Further research on each of these
issues may be needed; further guidance to development
actors on how to handle criminal actors will be needed.
Ultimately, development planning for enclave scenarios
will be highly context-dependent and case-specific, and
must be undertaken both with a realistic and pragmatic
assessment of the leverage and capacity of external
donors to influence such dynamics, and with a view to the
do no harm principle.
In the mafia scenario, development actors confront a
more covert and clandestine game. As the Ghana and
Mozambique cases suggest, more may need to be
spent within development programming on tracking
and monitoring progress of the political environment,
particularly opaque political and economic dynamics
that might emerge in relation to electoral and legislative
processes. Criminal networks may be working within state
institutions to corrupt these processes – and to corrupt
development programs themselves. In the mafia scenario,
particular attention should be paid to strengthening
political processes and institutions, with efforts particularly
geared towards safeguarding the legitimacy and integrity
of electoral, legislative, and public procurement and
contracting processes and law enforcement and judicial
institutions. Efforts can also be aimed at bolstering vertical
accountability measures, particularly the role that nonstate
actors such as media, civil society organizations,
research entities, and academia can play in monitoring
and reporting on organized crime related activity.
While in the enclave scenario organized violence is central,
in some settings mafias rely more heavily on corruption –
while in others mafias can and do rely on armed violence
if they believe their essential interests are threatened. 110
Their preference is however to remain hidden powers,
operating from behind the scenes. 111 Only in extreme
cases will they resort to open confrontation with the state.
Development actors will need to look for entry points
w<strong>here</strong> they can reduce the influence of mafia actors within
the political process, without necessarily precipitating a
spike in violence. Identifying those entry points once again
requires highly context-dependent analysis and planning.
Since one of the key services mafia groups are providing
the state is access to social networks, mafia groups may
see alternative forms of mediating governance – such as
traditional authority and religious authority, as well as
civil society organizations – as more of a threat than state
government itself, with which it closely collaborates. 112
They may manage this threat by corrupting and co-opting
those civil institutions. That in turn suggests, however,
that strengthening ‘civil resistance’ to organized crime
may be a valuable entry-point for development strategies
in mafia scenarios. Civil resistance has been a key part of
the anti-mafia strategy in Italy. 113 And Roy Godson has
pointed to cases such as Sicily and Hong Kong in arguing
that “[c]hanges in culture can facilitate a breakup” of the
relationship between politics and organized crime. 114
110. Anton Blok (2008), “Reflections on the Sicilian Mafia: Peripheries and Their Impact on
<strong>Center</strong>s,” in Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 7-13: p. 7.
111. Carlo Morselli (2010), “Assessing Vulnerable and Strategic Positions in a Criminal Network,” in
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 382-392.
112. Blok, Anton (2008), “Reflections on the Sicilian Mafia: Peripheries and Their Impact on
Centres,” p. 8.
113. Parini, Ercole G. (2003), “Civil resistance: Society fights back,” in Felia Allum and Renate
Siebert (eds.), Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 147-
160.
114. Godson, Roy (2003), “The Political-Criminal Nexus and Global Security,” in Roy Godson
(ed.), Menace to society: political-criminal collaboration around the world, New Brunswick/London:
Transaction Publishers, p. 13.
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Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
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