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III. The Impact of Organized Crime on
Governance
Jamaica’s political and economic elite has been deeply
implicated in nurturing the emergence of organized crime
and violence in Jamaica over the past forty years. National
responses to organized crime and violence have primarily
been taken when political conflict and corruption have put
the country in a bad light on the international stage, as was
the case involving Dudus Coke in Tivoli Garden, or when
gang leaders and politicians are aligned in bringing rates
of violence down, as was the case with the restructuring
of security arrangements in downtown Kingston from the
late 1990s onwards. However, even then efforts remain
superficial at best.
Much needed constitutional reforms have yet to take
place. The latter could reshape the way politics is waged
and organized crime is supported, ensuring tighter
oversight and transparency mechanisms. For example,
in light of a move among Commonwealth nations in the
Caribbean to shift away from the British parliamentary
system, which concentrated power within the Office
of the Prime Minister and provided limited checks and
balances, in 1991 a Committee was established to provide
recommendations for constitutional reform in Jamaica.
The Stone Committee Report recommended the adoption
of a presidential model with effective checks and balances
on executive power. The report’s recommendations were
however rejected in favor of a limit on the number of
legislative members who could be appointed to the prime
minister’s Cabinet and limited reforms have since been
implemented. 44
Despite significant external investment in supporting
key political and governance reforms through traditional
development assistance or other sources of foreign aid,
Jamaican institutions remain weak and, apart from the
military, most institutions have been unable to foster trust
among the population: the police are viewed “with great
distrust and [often] perceived as instigators of violence.” 45
Equally weak is the Jamaican justice system: courts are
44. Barrows-Giles, Cynthia (2010).“Regional Trends in Constitutional Developments in the
Commonwealth Caribbean,” Paper Prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, January
2010. Available at: http://webarchive.ssrc.org/pdfs/Cynthia_Barrow-Giles_Constitutional_
Development_in_the_Commonwealth_Caribbean_CPPF_Briefing%20Paper%20_f_.pdf.
45. Abuelafia and Sedlacek (2010).
backlogged, while poor infrastructure and outdated
practices add to existing challenges. Laws are enforced
inconsistently, and t<strong>here</strong> is a sense that individuals are
not treated equally by the justice system. 46 Jamaica’s
eight prisons and four juvenile facilities are overcrowded,
with little segregation for high needs groups. 47 These
conditions have created a lack of trust in the justice system,
increased incidents of “mob justice,” and fostered a turn to
community justice mechanisms to resolve crime. 48
The government adopted a hard-line security response in
the wake of the Tivoli incursion. Supported by members
of the international community, the response has led to
a “concomitant disruption to criminal networks, and a
negotiated end to violence with leading criminal groups.” 49
Combined, these efforts, many of which included the
arbitrary use of force, have contributed to a decline
in crime over the past year. 50 They also inadvertently
bolstered the legitimacy of the former Bruce Golding
Administration, despite the fact that Golding himself was
clearly implicated in attempting to disrupt the course of
justice and providing protection to Dudus. 51
In this case like many others, were it not for direct
international pressure, Bruce Golding would not have
moved against Coke despite his hard work to build a
national profile as a reformer. Golding had sought to avoid
extradition because of personal and party connections
to the historic Shower Posse leadership, the importance
of the Kingston Western Constituency to the JLP and to
Golding himself, and because of the disruption that such
an effort would entail for security in Jamaica over both the
short and long term. Coke had worked collaboratively with
Jamaican officials and other criminal groups to establish
an intricate security arrangement for downtown Kingston.
46. Government of Jamaica (2007). Jamaican Justice System Reform Task Force Final Report.
Available at:
http://www.cba.org/jamaicanjustice/pdf/jjsrtf_report_final.pdf.
47. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank (2007). Crime, Violence, and
Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean. Report No. 37820. Available at:
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr_and_Vio_Car_E.pdf.
48. Ibid
49. Arias (2010).
50. Rights groups and individual civilians complained that the government had used excessive
force during and after the Tivoli incursion. These groups and individuals were joined by the
public defender in initiating calls for inquiries into the operations of the security forces during
and after the Tivoli incursion. Powell, Lawrence and Lewis, Balford (2009). The Political Culture of
Democracy in Jamaica, 2008: The Impact of Governance. University of the West Indies/Americas
Barometer/LAPOP/Vanderbilt University. Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2008/
jamaica-en.pdf.
51. Having initially denied it in parliamentary session, Golding himself admitted that he had
covertly retained a U.S. law firm in Washington, D.C. to help negotiate a political settlement to
the Dudus affair, namely to avoid extradition. Golding has since stepped down as Prime Minister.
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Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries