here - Center on International Cooperation - New York University

The growing incidence of cybercrime (both organized and
‘disorganized’), with its low entry barriers and low risks in
developing countries, carries serious social implications,
many of which remain unexplored by development actors,
not least because it is generally assumed that cybercrime
does not have direct implications for the poor. This is an
erroneous assumption since high incidences of cybercrime
and weak cyber security in a specific jurisdiction can place
significant strains on judicial systems and, by extension,
the public purse. It also impacts businesses and can serve
as a deterrent to potential investors. And while cyber
crime might provide large swathes of unemployed youth
with low-risk income, their technical skills might be put to
better and more sustainable use through innovative startup
schemes supported by public-private partnerships or
by employing these young entrepreneurs in legitimate
e-governance initiatives.
With the latter in mind, as a means to support crimesensitive
social and economic policy development,
development actors can:
Targeted Action
3.1 Ensure citizens’ participation in the development
of smarter crime-sensitive social and economic
development policies. This can be achieved through
strengthening the capacity of civil society and community
groups to engage the government and political actors on
organized crime-related issues. For example, recent efforts
to reduce violence in crime-ridden localities in Jamaica’s
garrison towns or Brazil’s favelas through the introduction
of vertical accountability measures into citizen security
policies have yielded some interesting results, at least
in terms of reduction of violence. It is unclear, though,
whether, and under what structure, organized criminal
activity still continues. Investing in research on these
additional elements would help determine w<strong>here</strong> to
allocate additional resources for citizen security measures
while simultaneously tackling organized crime. 46
46. See also Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011), Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized
Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America: Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers,
Brookings Institution; and Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011), Calderon’s Caldron: Lessons from Mexico’s
Battle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán
(particularly the section on Ciudad Juarez).
3.2 Map socio-economic impacts of efforts to counter
organized crime. Donors can invest more in understanding
the impacts of alternatively formalizing or prohibiting
informal or illicit markets.
3.3 Support public participation and debate on
the development and implementation of smarter drug
treatment policies in response to drug dependency, and
prioritizing citizens’ health and social development over
criminalization.
3.4 Increase support to specialized bodies
responsible for investigating, monitoring, and prosecuting
environmental crimes such as illegal logging, the illegal
trade in wildlife, and e-waste dumping.
3.5 Increase support to governments to develop,
with strong citizen participation, more effective livelihood
opportunities to prevent and respond to the harmful
effects of illicit resource extraction, particularly water
bodies that are the only source of potable water for local
populations; and as a means to reduce environmental
crime. The effectiveness of the latter will be contingent on
demand reduction strategies for natural resources across
the board and the provision of socio-economic alternatives
for those most dependent on them.
3.6 Invest in understanding the incentives driving
young people to engage in cyber criminal activity, and its
impact on employment and economic growth.
4. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA
Organized crime can lead to a weakening or firewalling
of vertical accountability bodies and mechanisms such
as civil society, academia, and the independent media. In
Ghana, for example, the space for discussing organized
crime, and the suspected involvement of members of
the political and economic elite, is very limited. Many
suspect that this is due to the politicization of academia,
civil society, and the media, which prevents these actors
from playing an oversight role. Across the case studies, lack
of access to accurate and transparent data is a problem.
Civil society organizations are often reluctant to engage
27
Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
NYU
CIC