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lower-level officials, but the stance of other officials in
the government influences the contours of the threat
(…)” When high-level government actors are complicit
in drug trafficking and opposition from other parts of
the government is weak, the situation is stable and the
prognosis for [counternarcotics] efforts is poor. Direct
interventions to reduce drug trafficking are unlikely to
have an impact. When high-level government actors
complicit in drug-trafficking face strong anti-trafficking
factions in other parts of the government, the prognosis
for reform is hard to predict; direct interventions
may be possible but are potentially destabilizing. By
contrast, when government involvement only extends
to lower-level officials, the threat to governance is
lower. The prospects for reform are strongest when
high-level officials champion counternarcotics efforts,
but are less clear when no high-level officials do so,
though political pressure may advance reform in this
scenario.” 57
Such an assessment would enable development actors
to determine initial political obstacles to engagement on
drug trafficking (and broader organized crime) issues, even
if commitment has been anchored in theory, in national
development or security strategies, bilateral agreements
or other. It can also help determine the degree to which
civil society can be engaged in the response to organized
crime.
For example, in the case studies conducted for our own
research, high-level officials in two of the countries –
57. USAID (April 2013), The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa: A Programming
Guide
Ghana and Sierra Leone – have publicly condemned
government involvement in drug trafficking. Despite huge
external investments to bolster capacity in these countries,
significant challenges remain. Notwithstanding, direct
interventions in these countries are still possible and do
not appear to be destabilizing. External support to these
countries has, however, been front-loaded to supporting
traditional law enforcement efforts, with limited focus on
targeted deterrence or accompanying law enforcement
mechanisms with efforts aimed at bolstering vertical and
horizontal accountability mechanisms, although the latter
might be destabilizing if core interests are threatened.
In Nepal and Mozambique, high-level officials have not
made any obvious statements signaling their opposition
to state involvement in drug trafficking (or other forms
of organized crime). Given how organized criminal gangs
have been used to support political objectives in Nepal,
direct intervention might not be advisable, although efforts
can be channeled to supporting inter-party dialogue and
the development of Codes of Conduct to guide behavior
during periods of tense political contestation. In Jamaica,
and until 2009, empty statements were often made by
high-level officials to signal their opposition to state
involvement in organized crime. Direct interventions were
possible, but were fruitful only when accompanied by
significant political pressure from the United States, which
in turn was driven by its own national interest of stemming
the flow of drugs and arms to its territory. Meanwhile, in
Guyana, government involvement in organized crime
or criminal penetration of government at all levels is
obvious, but t<strong>here</strong> are no champions for countering
Level of Corruption /Infiltration
Low Level Officials
High-Level Officials
Opposition within Government
Strong: High-level officials
Best scenario for direct
Direct interventions
oppose state involvement in
interventions
possible but potentially
trafficking
destabilizing
Weak: Relatively few high-
Direct interventions most
Direct interventions not
level officials oppose state
effective when combined with
advisable
involvement in trafficking
increased political pressure
Figure 2. Drawn from USAID The Development Response to Drug Trafficking in Africa (p.20)
NYU
CIC
Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries