here - Center on International Cooperation - New York University

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IV. CONCLUSIONS
As noted in this report, organized crime is a problem
affecting many countries across the globe. It is not an
emerging or new challenge, but rather a long-standing
feature of global society, very unfortunate for some,
bringing illicit fortunes to others. Public and private
sector corruption, and the involvement of political actors
in criminal activity, are also long-standing features of
political societies, regardless of country. These challenges
have become more complex because of organized crime’s
transnational nature in a tightly connected world. Building
resilience into governance systems against organized
crime, political, and public sector corruption (and their
potent mix) is critical for development and security.
Indeed, in each of the case studies conducted for this
project, one core element was a constant throughout:
political and public sector corruption, including within
political parties, the judiciary, and the security services,
allow organized crime to flourish, undermining the
legitimacy of core governance institutions and their
responsibility to develop and deliver effective social and
economic policies at national and local levels. In some
countries, organized crime is used as an instrument
of politics, leaving citizens with few disincentives for
engaging in, or benefiting from illicit activities. In others
it is a major driver of insecurity, leading to extreme levels
of gang-related violence and homicides or provoking
important health and environmental risks. Delinking
organized crime from politics while enhancing legitimate
governance and the delivery of services will remain the
most important challenge for developing countries. A
focus on reducing the ‘thickness’ or the extent of the links
between governance and organized crime through efforts
aimed at shaping responsible state, institutional and
societal behavior with regards to organized crime while
simultaneously ensuring the protection of fundamental
rights, should be the starting point.
The pressures of the international financial crisis have led
donors to reduce development assistance in political and
economic governance and strengthening the rule of law.
If serious about organized crime, development actors (and
their legislatures) must rethink assistance approaches
in these areas, and how they can better support the
integration of organized-crime sensitive programming
into development and security strategies. In doing so, they
will also need to pay more attention to aid’s unintended
consequences, inadvertently nurturing or reinforcing
the illicit economy and organized crime. These steps will
require bold engagement. They will also require equally
bold responses from national stakeholders, as long as the
right safety nets are in place. Citizens should be at the
center of these engagements.
Development actors can play a smarter role in responding
to the impacts of organized crime and reducing the
extent of its grip on governance in developing countries.
They need smarter and more targeted analytical and
programming frameworks to strategically determine
when to engage and w<strong>here</strong> to focus efforts, particularly
with regard to addressing weaknesses identified in
governance frameworks, identifying and prioritizing
organized crime actors and activities that do most harm
in a given context, supporting deterrence rather than
zero-tolerance strategies, and ensuring that citizen needs
and respect for fundamental human rights are central
to proposed remedies. Certain countries – the UK, US,
Germany and Norway - are moving in this direction, at
least in terms of funding research, but better efforts need
to be made to support national and regional stakeholders
build resilience against organized crime from within.
Drawing extensively from the case studies and our
research, we have suggested five core areas w<strong>here</strong> we
believe donors can play a smarter role in responding to
the impacts of organized crime and reducing the extent
of its grip on political processes (Section II). In support
of those efforts, we have laid out options for assessment
and analytical frameworks to help donors strategically
determine when to engage and w<strong>here</strong> to focus efforts
(Section III). We have combined these under one broad
organized crime-sensitive programming framework (see
figure 3 below) to be used on its own or in conjunction
with broader development strategies. Our hope is that
the framework and the tools might assist development
actors become smarter at programming for development
in countries w<strong>here</strong> organized crime and corruption
NYU
CIC
Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries