46 3.4 INCREASE SUPPORT TO SPECIALIZED BODIES RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING, MONITORING, AND PROSECUTING ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES SUCH AS ILLEGAL LOGGING, ILLEGAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE, AND E-WASTE DUMPING. 3.5 INCREASE SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENTS TO DEVELOP MORE EFFECTIVE LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF ILLICIT RESOURCE EXTRACTION, PARTICULARLY WATER BODIES THAT ARE THE ONLY SOURCE OF POTABLE WATER FOR SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE; AND AS A MEANS TO REDUCE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME. 3.6 INVEST IN UNDERSTANDING THE INCENTIVES DRIVING YOUNG PEOPLE TO ENGAGE IN CYBER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, AND THE IMPACT CYBER CRIME HAS ON EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. 4.1 SUPPORT EFFORTS TO SECURE ASYLUM FOR THOSE WHO ARE TARGETS OF THREATS, AND LEVERAGE THE SUPPORT OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES TO PROVIDE MONITORING CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS AND TOOLS TO SUPPORT SAFE AND RAPID REPORTING. 4.2 SUPPORT EFFORTS BY CIVIL SOCIETY OR JOINT GOVERNMENT-CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS TO CONDUCT CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME AND POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION, INCLUDING AROUND ELECTORAL PROCESSES. 4.3 SUPPORT EVIDENCE-BASED DEBATES ON CORE POLICIES THAT HAVE A STRONG IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ACROSS COUNTRIES. 4. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 5.1 SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT PROVIDING DIFFERENT SOURCES FOR COLLECTING AND MONITORING CRIME AND FINANCIAL DATA. DONORS SHOULD EXPLORE POTENTIAL PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, INCLUDING MAJOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES AS A MEANS TO LEAP- FROG SOME OF THE TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN THE COLLECTION AND PROCESSING OF BASELINE DATA AND SUPPORT MORE PARTICIPATORY FORMS OF DATA COLLECTION. 5. DEEPENING THE KNOWLEDGE BASE 5.2 INVEST IN STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLICY THINK-TANKS AND ACADEMIA TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME. 5.3 INVEST IN MAPPING DEVELOPMENT ACTOR EFFORTS AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME (PARTICULARLY SUPPORT TO JUSTICE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE BODIES) AND ASSESSING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. IN PARTICULAR, AND IN RESPECT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SHARED ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, DONORS SHOULD ALSO BECOME MORE TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE LIMITED IMPACT OF THE SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES SPENT ON SUPPORTING BETTER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 5.4 INVEST IN STRENGTHENING INTERNAL [DEVELOPMENT AGENCY] ANALYTICAL CAPACITY AND TOOLS AND THOSE OF NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS Figure 3 NYU CIC Resp<strong>on</strong>ding to the Impact of Organized Crime <strong>on</strong> Developing Countries
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- Page 1 and 2: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY i CENTER ON INT
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Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
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Introduction Ghana is experiencing
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I. Political, Instituional, Socio-E
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overwhelmingly supported by Ewes in
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and community over generations. Thi
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the potential increases in crime an
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charged with conspiracy to distribu
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and ratified a series of regional a
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funds related to money laundering.
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and Takoradi. The consignments come
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In the years preceding 2008, Ghanai
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may be attributed to the nature of
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etween the two main political parti
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police and custom officials arreste
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levels, however, treatment for drug
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V. The Donor Context Most external
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• Addressing socio-economic chall
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Ellis, Stephen (2009). ‘West Afri
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‘High Toxic Levels Found at Schoo
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Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
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Introduction Organized crime captur
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II. The Political Instiution and So
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to anchor contracts. 13 Meanwhile,
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promoting alternative approaches to
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II. The Nature and Scope of Organiz
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of contraband along the potential
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investigation into Suleman’s alle
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Rovers, Mitsubishi Colts, Land Crui
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may have been involved in launderin
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linkages between senior FRELIMO off
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seeking to more strongly align its
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Kyed, Helene Maria (2007), State Re
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Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
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Introduction Emerging from a decade
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political figures in Sierra Leone a
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After 150 years under British colon
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signed on behalf of the government
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and economic development. 75 Amidst
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Notwithstanding, in 2011 several in
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provoked by an air traffic controll
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which raises some concern that the
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smuggled diamonds to Belgium in 199
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Concerns about the resilience and c
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the current Sierra Leonean governme
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egional countries through the WACI.
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V. Conclusions Sierra Leone has mad
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• Beyond traditional support and
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Gbla, Osman (2007). “Security Sec
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United Nations Security Council (20
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Newspaper Online, January 21. Avail
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Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
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Introduction Guyana is located on t
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Afro-Guyanese and mixed race popula
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Guyanese town Buxton claimed joint
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is primarily based on exports from
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The electronic intelligence devices
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Desi Bouterese, head of the main op
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sector plan based on the government
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development actors might consider a
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Kaieteur News, 2009, Roger Khan Ple
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Annex VI - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED
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I. Regional, Political, Institution
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heterogeneous than they are today.
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that had few economic resources. Po
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II. The Nature of Organized Crime i
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gangs in central and western Kingst
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A US diplomatic cable released by W
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some projects leads to lower levels
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professionalizing the police. Dilap
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Bibliography Books Figueroa, Mark a
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“Jamaica’s Women Drug Mules fil
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Annual Review of Global Peace Opera