FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
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<strong>FOI</strong>-R--<strong>3990</strong>--<strong>SE</strong><br />
connected with Russia’s political elite, there is a fear that under certain<br />
conditions excessive economic dependence could be leveraged to achieve<br />
Russia’s political goals in Latvia.<br />
Zeltins points out that Russian capital tends to promote an “offshorization of<br />
Latvia”. Transparency issues could also be highlighted in the light of the<br />
corruption associated with particular investments. Transparency International<br />
published the Bribe Payers Index in 2011. It states that Chinese and Russian<br />
firms are the most likely to pay bribes while operating abroad. 341 Another<br />
characteristic of Russian business culture is that a successful business almost<br />
cannot exist without the participation of political mediators – big business goes<br />
hand in hand not only with bribes but also with politics. 342<br />
One way for Russia to support its interests in Latvia is to establish relations with<br />
economic groupings that have close ties with political parties in Latvia. Before<br />
the parliamentary elections of 2010, three political parties had direct links with<br />
the Latvian tycoons or oligarchs who, according to press reports, had deep<br />
business interests in Russian businesses in Latvia or Russia itself. 343 If political<br />
processes are affected by private business interests, there is the potential for<br />
political corruption. Meanwhile, if political influence is used to promote Russia’s<br />
(or its businesses’) interests in exchange for personal gain, this should be treated<br />
as a concern for national security. Safeguards and restrictions at the institutional<br />
level are sometimes avoided because of the close links between politicians and<br />
the economic elite, thereby intensifying the risk of corruption and damaging the<br />
role of institutions in economic interactions. 344<br />
4.7 Energy Policy and the Gazprom Lobby<br />
Latvia’s dependence on Russian natural gas supplies makes its economy<br />
vulnerable and limits its foreign policy options. Nonetheless, in relations between<br />
Latvia and Russia there have been no serious conflicts connected to energy<br />
issues.<br />
After the economic crisis in Russia in 1998, Latvia quickly redirected its external<br />
trade towards the EU member states, but this was not possible in the energy<br />
sector. Latvia, like the other Baltic states, is an energy island that is still<br />
separated from the EU energy supply network. This is true for both electricity<br />
341<br />
Transparency International (2011): Bribe Payers Index 2011, October 2011,<br />
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20111025_launch_bpi_2011.<br />
342 Spruds A., [ed.)] (2012): The Economic Presence of Russia and Belarus in the Baltic States: Risks<br />
and Opportunities, Riga: CEEPS, LIIA, p. 296.<br />
343<br />
Pelnens G. & Potjomkina D. (2012): ‘The Political implications of Latvia’s economic relations with<br />
Russia and Belarus’, in Spruds A., (ed.), The Economic Presence of Russia and Belarus in the Baltic<br />
States: Risks and Opportunities, Riga: CEEPS, LIIA, p.187.<br />
344<br />
Ibid. p. 188.<br />
106