FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad

FOI-R--3990--SE
2014, Litgas, a gas supplying company controlled by Lietuvos Energija,
reported that it had signed a contract with Statoil for the supply of LNG.
This will reduce, but not eliminate, Lithuania’s dependency on Russian
gas. 437
Dependency on Russian oil supplies to the Lithuanian oil refinery,
Mažeikių Nafta.
The pressing need to build new installations to produce electricity, such
as a new nuclear power plant after the existing one was closed, and to
connect the Lithuanian electricity system with Western systems.
The problems in the energy sector were inherited from Soviet times but they are
exacerbated by Russia’s determination to use energy-related, non-military power
means. All Lithuanian steps to avoid or minimize the above-mentioned risks are
met with Russian pressure. Lithuania’s decision to implement the Third Energy
Package and its strategy to unbundle the gas transit system in Lithuania have
resulted in Lithuania having to pay the highest market price for Gazprom’s gas in
Europe. The strategic decision to sell Mažeikių Nafta to Poland’s PKN Orlen
was met with harsh measures – the oil flow to Mažeikių Nafta was stopped in
2006 and the Druzhba pipeline remains dry to this day.
There is a clear understanding of the risks in this field. To counter these risks,
Lithuania established a NATO-certified Energy Security Centre of Excellence in
Vilnius in 2013. 438 Lithuania’s strategy is based not on eliminating Russia from
the energy sector, but on counterbalancing its presence. The strategy also
includes the securitization and externalization of Lithuanian energy
vulnerabilities, because most of the pressing energy security problems can be
resolved only with the help of partners, a common strategic European approach
and large-scale investment in the sector. 439 Lithuania, as an individual country, is
short of big strategic finance.
On the other hand, the traditional Russian power strategy in the energy sector has
witnessed some new and interesting twists: major projects that could enhance
energy security in Lithuania – the new nuclear power plant in Visaginas, the
LNG terminal and a shale gas exploration tender – have become targets of
aggressive information and media campaigns. Russia and Gazprom used their
local business and political assets as well as new tools. “Neo-innocence clubs”
organized “pro-environment” and “anti-nuclear” media campaigns, which
culminated in a referendum that resulted in a negative vote on the NPP, and
437 This paragraph has been written by Mr. Tomas Malmlöf, FOI, as a way of updating the text of
this chapter.
438 See http://www.enseccoe.org/.
439 See National Security Strategy of Lithuania (2012-06-26),
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_lp_id=433830.
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