FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
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<strong>FOI</strong>-R--<strong>3990</strong>--<strong>SE</strong><br />
encouraged local communities in Žygaičiai to campaign against shale gas<br />
exploration. 440 The Russian media was active in providing publicity for these<br />
campaigns and during the referendum. It also organized aggressive political<br />
reporting on the LNG terminal project, which forced reactions from Norway’s<br />
ambassador and business representatives. 441<br />
It is therefore no surprise that when, in the autumn of 2013, Lithuania<br />
experienced additional economic pressure – a transport blockade on the<br />
Kaliningrad border and a temporary Russian ban on the import of Lithuanian<br />
dairy products – the first reaction was to link it with the ongoing negotiations<br />
between Lithuania and Gazprom. 442 The State Security Department in Lithuania<br />
had warned, however, in the summer of 2013 of the possibility of aggressive<br />
tactics by Russia against Lithuania during its Presidency of the Council of the<br />
European Union. 443 The first signs came with Russia’s pressure on Moldavian<br />
wine and Ukrainian chocolate producers.<br />
The entire Russian strategy during Lithuania’s Presidency could be described as<br />
a political “effects-based operation”. This military concept, although criticized<br />
by the military, can be borrowed by the political realm to illustrate and explain<br />
what Lithuania experienced during the second half of 2013. Such operations first<br />
outline the end-goal and then use alternative, non-military means to achieve it.<br />
These could be economic, media-related or logistical to cripple, demoralize and<br />
confuse the opponent.<br />
During its presidency, Lithuania witnessed a whole complex of pressure by<br />
Russia, which started with a joint Russian-Belarusian military drill. Zapad 2013,<br />
on the Lithuanian border, which played out a fairly aggressive scenario. 444 It<br />
continued with pressure in the economic spheres where Lithuania is most<br />
dependent on Russia: the transportation of and trade in dairy products.<br />
Lithuanian vehicles were stopped at the border with Kaliningrad and it was<br />
announced that all trucks would go through a special checking procedure. This<br />
440 The results of the referendum were 62.7% against the construction of the NPP, and 34% in<br />
favour. See<br />
http://www.enmin.lt/en/activity/veiklos_kryptys/strateginiai_projektai/Visaginas_npp.phpclear_c<br />
ache=Y.<br />
441 “Interview with the CEO of Hoegh LNG”, Lithuanian Tribune (2013-11-04),<br />
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/55782/interview-with-the-ceo-of-hoegh-lng-201355782/.<br />
442 See “Opinion: Why is the ruling coalition so afraid to win the arbitrage against Gazprom”,<br />
Lithuanian Tribune (2013-09-06), http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/49807/opinion-why-is-theruling-coalition-so-afraid-to-win-the-arbitrage-against-gazprom-201349807/.<br />
443 See National Security Strategy of Lithuania, op. cit.<br />
444 Karlis Neretnieks (2013): “Opinion: Zapad 2013 – observations and perspectives”, Lithuanian<br />
Tribune (2013-10-15), http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/53648/opinion-zapad-2013-observationsand-perspectives-201353648/.<br />
139