FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad

FOI-R--3990--SE
6 Conclusions and Implications for
Further Research
Dr Mike Winnerstig, FOI
6.1 General Conclusions
The empirical chapters on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in this report are, as was
noted above, “written from within”, i. e. written by analysts in the Baltic states.
This means that the views presented should be considered as “first cuts”, and that
other studies on these topics can be made from other perspectives.
That said, however, a number of general conclusions can be drawn from this
comprehensive overview of the issue of Russian soft power and non-military
influence in the Baltic states. First and foremost, Russian actors – normally
financed or directly governed by the Russian federation itself – are engaged in
the implementation of a strategy of soft power, in the Russian sense, in all the
three Baltic states, wielding non-military power and influence in a number of
areas. Primarily, this relates to the so-called Compatriots Policy, which entails
supporting all Russian-speaking people outside Russia proper. The emphasis here
is on language rather than ethnicity.
Second, all three Baltic states see themselves as the target of strategies devised
by ideologues such as Alexander Dugin and theorists such as Sergei Karaganov,
and implemented by activists such as Modest Kolerov and establishment figures
such as Konstantin Kosachev – with the full backing of the Kremlin. These
strategies apparently aim not only to promote the Russian-speaking minorities in
the Baltic states but also to undermine the Baltic states as political entities, as
well as the self-confidence of their non-Russian populations and confidence in
the ability of the EU and NATO to assist the Baltic states in the event of an
external crisis.
Third, Russia’s strategy involves substantial interference in the domestic political
systems of the Baltic states. The linkages between the United Russia party in
Russia, on the one hand, and the Estonian Centre Party, the Latvian Harmony
Centre and the Lithuanian Electoral Action for Poles in Lithuania, on the other,
are just one sign of this. Non-transparent forms of Russian economic support for
these Baltic political parties is another.
Fourth, all the Baltic states have been the target of Russian accusations regarding
their allegedly “fascist” past and their alleged current attachment to “fascism”.
These accusations form a broad base from which Russian or Russia-related
actors in the Baltic states seem to work to undermine the political credibility of
142