FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
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<strong>FOI</strong>-R--<strong>3990</strong>--<strong>SE</strong><br />
links with political power in Moscow. Perhaps to alleviate negative nationalist<br />
associations, the Russian International Affairs Council suggests that the Russian<br />
Orthodox Church should be positioned as a transnational institute rather than a<br />
strictly national one. 58<br />
2.9 Conclusions<br />
At first glance, it might seem that the concept of soft power is an attractive and<br />
rather innocent tool in a country’s foreign policy. As is demonstrated above,<br />
however, it is an area full of pitfalls. Russia uses both hard and soft power to<br />
exert influence. The Georgian War in 2008 showed that the use of military force<br />
in Russia’s neighbourhood is never far away. This was shown again when<br />
Crimea was annexed in 2014.<br />
The use of Russian soft power seems likely to increase, at least if all the official<br />
statements are to be believed. The political will is clearly there, the basic<br />
governmental infrastructure is in place and there is potential for expansion too.<br />
The mere fact of all the investment in miagkaia sila indicates that the Russian<br />
political leadership has felt the lack of Russian soft power. The focus today is on<br />
language, culture and anti-Americanism. This raises several questions over<br />
seemingly contradictory policies and unclear definitions.<br />
First, there is an internal contradiction between the Russian principle of nonintervention<br />
in foreign relations and the use of soft power. This is also reflected<br />
in the declared view that soft power is a double-edged sword. The attractive side<br />
of soft power is recognized while at the same time the concept is seen as the<br />
work of foreign intelligence services in Russia and hence a threat to national<br />
security.<br />
Second, both the notion of “compatriots” and the broader concept of the Russian<br />
World lack clear definitions. This is not a new problem, but when it comes to<br />
using soft power it can be complicated to get your message across if your<br />
audience has not been identified.<br />
Third, the sheer number of state organizations and semi-governmental NGO in<br />
the sphere – often with the same or overlapping aims – makes a coordinated<br />
policy very difficult. The division of labour in soft power efforts between the two<br />
major agencies, Rossotrudnichestvo and Russkii mir, is not always clear.<br />
Furthermore, soft power efforts are often undercut by other Kremlin actors.<br />
During the so-called year of friendship between Russia and the Netherlands in<br />
2013, the image of Russia took a negative turn in connection with an official<br />
58 Russian International Affairs Council (2012): Postulates on Russia’s Foreign Policy, Report 4, 20<br />
September, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/id_4=838#top, p. 31.<br />
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