FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad

FOI-R--3990--SE
Executive Summary
The recent Russian military aggression against Ukraine has caused substantial
concern not only in the Baltic states but also in Scandinavia and other parts of
Europe. However, the Baltic states are NATO members and thus an attack on
them would be considered by US decision makers an attack against the United
States too. The deterrence value of this is probably very high.
This deterrence factor notwithstanding, other measures could be used against the
Baltic states, the smallest, geographically closest Western neighbours of Russia –
and thus the most vulnerable. This report does not focus on traditional military
threats, but instead on a much talked-about but less well-known phenomenon –
Russian non-military influence and “soft power” in the Baltic states.
Soft power deals in its original form not with the actual wielding of power or
influence by an actor but with the power of attraction. In the Russian context,
however, soft power is often used in a different way to denote the ability of an
actor to wield power in a number of non-military, non-traditional ways, such as
through disgruntled minority groups, media outlets, the entertainment industry
and the domestic political system of another country. Sometimes it can also
denote more traditional means, such as the use of economic or energy related but
still non-military assets against another state. Soft power, in this interpretation, is
therefore something that an actor can wield against something, and can thus be
considered another – or a new – tool of state power. By definition, this means
that soft power and non-military influence can be part of the arsenal that a state
has at its disposal in a conflict. To wield soft power might even be a new and
much more effective tactic in a conflict than a traditional military attack –
especially if the target is protected militarily through an alliance with bigger and
more important actors.
In this study, we analyse both soft power and other non-military means of
influence, such as energy and economic issues. They all have in common that
they explicitly omit military means and that they can be used within a multitude
of adversarial contexts short of traditional, militarized conflicts.
A soft power offensive can be devastating if it is directed at undermining the
cohesion and self-confidence of another state as a political entity. Traditional
military defence forces cannot do very much against such attacks.
Hence, the goal of this report is to analyse the forms, extent and effectiveness of
Russian soft power and non-military influence in the Baltic states. The time span
is essentially the last five years, ending in mid-2014. It asks a number of
questions:
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