FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
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<strong>FOI</strong>-R--<strong>3990</strong>--<strong>SE</strong><br />
showed a propaganda film about Edgar Savisaar. 116 People are able to watch<br />
Tsentr via satellite and cable in Estonia, but the channel itself is owned by<br />
Moscow’s city administration. It is based in Moscow, does not have an office in<br />
Estonia and does not have a local programme for Estonia’s Russian-speakers<br />
either. The decision to show a propaganda film about the Estonian opposition<br />
leader within days of the national elections is likely to have been taken in<br />
Moscow.<br />
In addition to the Russian channels, the Baltic Media Alliance channel Pervõi<br />
Baltiiski Kanal (First Baltic Channel, PBK) has been closely associated with the<br />
Centre Party. Oleg Samorodnij, the former correspondent of Komsomolskaya<br />
Pravda, recently published a book on how the Kremlin is spreading its ideology<br />
in Estonia using the media, including PBK. He suggests that the question of<br />
whether the PBK supports the Estonian Centre Party is not that crucial, because it<br />
is obvious that it does. Instead, he raises two sets of questions: Who coordinates<br />
the activities, and how are they being coordinated between PBK and the Centre<br />
Party Who made the decision that PBK will support the Centre Party and where<br />
was it made 117 According to Samorodnij, “I don’t think that these decisions are<br />
being made by PBK in Estonia; and I also don’t believe that decisions in Riga are<br />
made by BMA. I think these decisions are made in Moscow”. 118<br />
3.5 The Russian Media Presence and Its<br />
Consequences<br />
In Estonia, Estonians and non-Estonians live in different information spaces,<br />
often with contrasting content. They receive their information from different<br />
sources, in different languages and through different media channels. According<br />
to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Russia’s priority is to<br />
ensure its objective perception in the world, develop its own effective means of<br />
information and influence on public opinion abroad and strengthen the role of the<br />
Russian mass media in the international information environment, providing<br />
them with essential state support. The opportunities offered by new information<br />
and communications technologies are widely used in these activities. Most of the<br />
Russian-speaking population derives its information and views on history and<br />
116 Mikk Salu & Inga Springe (2012): “Who is the puppet and who is the master - PBK, Edgar<br />
Savisaar, the Center Party and Russian influence in Estonian politics”, Baltic Times, available at:<br />
http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/31077/#.U4W_FUlLCKA.<br />
117 Mikk Salu & Inga Springe (2012): “Who is the Puppet and Who is the Master”, Re:Baltica,<br />
April,<br />
http://www.rebaltica.lv/en/investigations/money_from_russia/a/688/who_is_the_puppet_and_who<br />
_is_the_master.html .<br />
118 Springe, I., Benfelde, S. and Salu, M. (2012): “The Unknown Oligarch”, Re:Baltica, April,<br />
http://www.rebaltica.lv/en/investigations/money_from_russia/a/686/the_unknown_oligarch.html<br />
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