FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad

FOI-R--3990--SE
operators, which control transmission, distribution and supply businesses. For
example, in Estonia AS Eesti Gaas has a dominant position in gas distribution
and transmission. The company supplies gas to over 90 per cent of the retail
market. Moreover, all the remaining gas sold by other entities is initially
purchased from Eesti Gaas. The company also owns EG Võrguteenused, the gas
distribution system operator, which is why the Estonian Parliament recently
adopted a law requiring the unbundling of transmission services from supply by
2015. The lack of a properly functioning gas market poses a significant risk in
terms of security of supply, according to the International Energy Agency’s 2013
review of Estonia. 163 Gazprom has a 37 per cent stake in Eesti Gaas and E.ON
almost 34 per cent. Currently, smaller shareholders, such as Latvian/Russian
Itera and Finnish Fortum, can still block major corporate decisions if required.
Gazprom’s influence might grow in the near future, however, since E. ON has
decided to pull out of the Baltic states. This means that there is a chance that
Gazprom might purchase the German firm’s shares, thereby becoming the
majority shareholder.
3.11 Russian Soft Power in Estonia: General
Conclusions
Russia is used to promoting its foreign policy goals using hard power, and it tries
to use its soft power in a similar fashion. The multitude of Russia-based or
Russia-financed actors in Estonia that convey essentially Russian messages in
various ways is one indication of this. The Compatriots Policy has not been
overly effective, however, as is shown by the fact that the percentage of stateless
persons – primarily former citizens of the Soviet Union – has decreased
dramatically from 32 per cent of the population in 1992 to less than 7 per cent
today. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of Russian-speaking Estonians have
been successfully integrated and there seems to be little traction for Russian
actors’ attempts to influence compatriots in Estonia.
The role of the Russian media is harder to measure. It is obvious that Estonians
and Russian-speaking Estonians live in different media and information
universes, where most Russian-speakers get their information from Russian
media outlets – and put most trust in these.
Cultural contacts between Estonia and Russia are a by-product of tradition and
history, and not detrimental per se. However, to the extent that cultural avenues
are used to convey political messages, this can amount to a negative aspect of
Russian soft power.
163 Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries, OECD, available at: http://www.oecdilibrary.org/energy/energy-policies-beyond-iea-countries_23070897.
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