FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
FOI-R--3990--SE_reducerad
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<strong>FOI</strong>-R--<strong>3990</strong>--<strong>SE</strong><br />
position conclude that any military threat is quite remote, particularly given the<br />
fact that post-Crimea developments have included a substantial response in terms<br />
of military and political solidarity between the Baltic states and their NATO<br />
allies, in particular the United States.<br />
However, some new means of power and influence are inherently difficult to<br />
counter by traditional military measures. When it comes to soft power, in all its<br />
forms, society is affected in a very different way than it would be by a military<br />
attack. A soft power offensive might on the face of it be basically positive, for<br />
example, if a nation’s government wanted to promote knowledge and<br />
understanding of its own cultural heritage in another country, but it can also be<br />
devastating if it is directed at undermining the cohesion and self-confidence of<br />
another state. Military defence forces can do very little against such attacks.<br />
Hence, the goal of this report is to analyse the forms, extent and – to a degree –<br />
effectiveness of Russian soft power and non-military influence in the Baltic<br />
states. The time span is essentially the last five years, ending in late 2013. It asks<br />
a number of questions:<br />
1) What form does Russian soft power take in the Baltic states<br />
2) Which organizations or actors play roles in the promotion of Russia’s<br />
soft power<br />
3) Do some domestic actors, such as political parties, have connections<br />
with Russia, and what roles do they play<br />
4) What is the role of the media as a conveyor of soft power<br />
5) To what extent are cultural factors important to Russia’s ability to wield<br />
non-military influence in the Baltic states<br />
6) Have Russian economic or business instruments become means of<br />
wielding soft power<br />
7) What role does the energy sector play in Russian soft power in the<br />
context of the Baltic states<br />
The concept of Russian soft power is not confined to the Baltic states. In chapter<br />
2, Dr Gudrun Persson examines the concept as a whole. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are<br />
written by Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian analysts, respectively, and deal with<br />
the implementation or execution of Russian soft power and non-military<br />
influence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Although these chapters are<br />
essentially written “from within”, they are written in a traditional scholarly<br />
fashion, with extensive footnotes making it possible for the reader to assess the<br />
report’s sources.<br />
The last chapter compares and analyses the empirical chapters in order draw<br />
conclusions and to suggest implications for future research.<br />
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