OECD Peer Review of E-Government in Denmark - ePractice.eu

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government as far as possible. Among the objectives for eDay 2 was an expectation of achieving a further 40% reduction in paper-based communications by November 2005. By 1 February 2005, nearly 92% of the 382 organisations subject to the requirements of eDay 2 had met them. This required that they implement digital signatures and establish appropriate means for the receipt and management of secure digitally signed e-mail. The remaining 8% of organisations (mainly small municipalities) were simply being slightly delayed due to minor technical issues related to their implementation of digital signatures. Aside from a further round of cost savings (which were expected to double with eDay 2) the initiative was expected to deliver flow-on benefits in terms of easier and more secure exchange of information, better quality services, and better responsiveness to citizens and businesses. A survey of the impact of eDay 2 conducted in April 2005 showed that 19% of organisations still sent and/or received a lot of paper-based communications, while a further 71% did so to a more limited extent. Even though it is not feasible that paper-based communication with and within government can be completely eliminated in the foreseeable future, these figures indicate that there are still opportunities for government to increase the use of digital communication, and enhance the resulting performance benefits and cost savings. Other conclusions drawn from the survey suggested that achieving a higher degree of electronic communication was conditional upon time and adjustment of the communications behaviour of government organisations, citizens and businesses. Again, organisations considered eDay 2 to have been both an organisational and technological challenge, but with eDay 2 the organisational aspect was generally considered slightly more difficult than the technical one. Internal business processes changed as a result of eDay 2 for approximately 90% of organisations. Lessons from eDay implementation The importance of the eDay business case One of the biggest impacts of the eDay initiative is that, once it is fully implemented, all Danish government organisations will have adopted the use of digital signatures and established means for exchanging secure electronic communications via e-mail. This has created a level of e-government readiness that, at least in the area of electronic communication, is yet to be achieved in many if not all other OECD countries. On its own, this would be an impressive achievement. It is made more so by the fact that, in the case of both eDays, adherence to the objectives was not made mandatory by the Government, but instead left entirely voluntary. One of the keys to achieving this level of commitment has been the strong business case underpinning eDay implementation. For the first eDay there was an expectation that 75% of internal paper-based government correspondence would be able to be conducted electronically. Some of the direct benefits (i.e. excluding gains in organisational performance and the quality of public services) expected were: • Annual savings of 300 tonnes of paper and EUR 25 million in postage costs, and undefined savings from reduced costs of internal mail handling. • A doubling of uptake of digital signatures in the public sector. • Benefits related to wider use of electronic document management systems. 157
Estimation of benefits for both eDays was confined to those which would accrue internally to the public sector. In the case of eDay 2, for instance, estimated cost savings only encompassed those arising from improvements in each organisation’s communication. Calculation of benefits that would be directly experienced by either citizens and/or businesses was deemed too difficult. Also, given that the eDay initiative did not impose any costs on citizens and businesses, there was no need to assess the external cost-benefit ratio of the initiative. Another incalculable element in the overall business case for both eDays was the all-of-government costs and benefits that would arise from altered processes of internal communication, presumably because such costs and benefits are either intangible or too difficult to quantify and assign. Within government the eDay initiative was not, of course, costless. As an example of these costs, for eDay 2 the forecasted average cost for each organisation was estimated to be DKK 100,000. The actual average cost came in under budget at DKK 73,158. The DKK 100,000 estimate included both internal adjustment costs and the costs of communication with citizens, businesses and other government organisations about the change in communications rights and processes. Having a sound business case for the eDay initiative has been an important element in its success. The existence of such readily achievable and (partially) tangible benefits, coupled with imposition of relatively small costs that did not necessitate large investments in new ICT, acted to easily convince the majority of government organisations of the merits of voluntarily participating in the eDay initiatives. The role of central leadership and support The Digital Task Force played a very active role in the implementation of both eDays. As project leader, it acted as a central point for all communication about eDay and provided direction on how organisations could best meet the requirements of the eDays. It produced guidance on issues ranging from how to communicate the eDay concept and objectives to collaborators through to purely technological questions, such as what format to use for electronic communications and when to use digital signatures. The Task Force also identified selected organisations that could act as “representative institutions” for the eDay initiative. These institutions implemented the changes required by eDay and eDay 2, providing examples of best practices for other organisations to follow. Marketing of the eDays was also important to their success. To minimize the use of paper-based communications, many organisations used promotional tools provided to them by the Digital Task Force to advertise their participation in the eDays and the impact that this would have on people and organisations with whom they communicated. Another important element of the successful implementation of eDay was the appointment of eDay co-ordinators in each government organisation. These co-ordinators were asked, with the active support of the Digital Task Force, to act as champions for the eDay initiative and provide leadership in preparing their organisations for the changes required. Creating appropriate incentives for participation Aside from the strong incentive created by the positive business case developed for the eDay initiative, government organisations were encouraged to participate by provision of incentives in four ways: 158
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OECD PEER REVIEW OF E-GOVERNMENT IN
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TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY ASSESSMEN
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ANNEX A: OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL AND
Page 7 and 8:
OECD PEER REVIEW OF E-GOVERNMENT IN
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While it is vital that the Governme
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Finance and the MVTU following thes
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this challenge was frequently menti
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Alongside the problem of the reliab
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In terms of its impact on organisat
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and businesses. While it is not cer
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considerable strategic importance t
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government organisations are aware
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8. Monitoring and evaluation Denmar
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Abstract There is a favourable envi
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E-government context Government pol
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The Structural Reform Between 2005
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administrative procedures. The find
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Figure 1.2 E-government structure a
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II. THE CASE FOR E-GOVERNMENT Denma
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• Creation of a competitive marke
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Abstract Government organisations c
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Source: OECD E-Government Survey: D
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Figure 3.2 Legislative and regulato
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modernisation process, especially i
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and the generally high level of tru
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fund it has created providing a tot
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outright barriers. The clearest evi
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Figure 3.5 Use of public digital se
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• Employment status: students and
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3: INFORMATION
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Figure 3.A.4 ICT usage among Danish
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Figure 3.A.8 Internet access among
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IV. PLANNING AND LEADERSHIP The e-g
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The strategy notes that Denmark is
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exchanged electronically. This is e
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with even lower rankings for driver
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involvement in e-government therefo
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In addition to support for the Join
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Figure 4.5 Responsibility for desig
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V. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE This chapt
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Structural Reform and e-government
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The Task Force has initiated a proj
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Figure 5.2 Share of documents recei
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Box 5.1 Improving middle management
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Abstract Collaboration is relativel
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Co-ordination of e-government polic
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Box 6.1 Key e-government co-ordinat
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The CRS encompasses a number of reg
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Digital signatures are now being wi
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Denmark - something that could be a
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Staffed by employees from the Digit
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The additional workload is connecte
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such a framework be designed; and 3
Page 107 and 108: schemas used in different areas of
Page 109 and 110: • Changing conditions in the publ
Page 111 and 112: municipalities, which might otherwi
Page 113 and 114: The current situation has evolved o
Page 115 and 116: Figure 6.6 Impacts of partnerships
Page 117 and 118: Source: OECD E-government Survey: D
Page 119 and 120: Abstract The Danish vision for e-go
Page 121 and 122: Figure 7.1 Drivers of e-government
Page 123 and 124: • To ensure internal knowledge of
Page 125 and 126: • The lack of information and the
Page 127 and 128: Figure 7.2 Source and type of e-gov
Page 129 and 130: Figure 7.4 Constraints on demand fo
Page 131 and 132: When asked about the level of impor
Page 133 and 134: eing for one group or another (e.g.
Page 135 and 136: Figure 7.8 Use of electronic delive
Page 137 and 138: The national portal www.denmark.dk
Page 139 and 140: identification of the relationship
Page 141 and 142: Abstract At the all-of-government l
Page 143 and 144: • At least 60 percent of all publ
Page 145 and 146: External audit Another important el
Page 147 and 148: can have impacts: 1) “service cha
Page 149 and 150: Figure 8.4 Responsibilities for mon
Page 151 and 152: CASE STUDY 1: STANDARDS-BASED E-GOV
Page 153 and 154: pharmacies (e.g. referrals and disc
Page 155 and 156: Danish approach of flexible decentr
Page 157: CASE STUDY 2: ACHIEVING E-GOVERNMEN
Page 161 and 162: ANNEX A: OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL AND
Page 163 and 164: ANNEX B: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND
Page 165 and 166: Administrative environment Organisa
Page 167 and 168: Other State government responsibili
Page 169 and 170: − Models to support inter-organis
Page 171 and 172: ICT usage As discussed in Chapter 3
Page 173 and 174: Promotion of IT Research and Educat
Page 175 and 176: other reforms. The plan identified
Page 177 and 178: Overall, these action plans were su
Page 179 and 180: E-mail addresses for everyone Anoth
Page 181 and 182: had developed extensive practical k
Page 183 and 184: ANNEX E: METHODOLOGY Definition of
Page 185 and 186: The survey asked State and local go
Page 187 and 188: ANNEX F: GLOSSARY This glossary was
Page 189 and 190: BIBLIOGRAPHY Agency for Governmenta
Page 191 and 192: Ministry of Science, Technology and
Page 193: Statistics Denmark (2004b), Nyt fra
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