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Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Counterintelligence developed the basic policies. By 1999, the effort had resulted in a functioning IC Assignment Program (ICAP), which produced rotational assignment guidelines for aspiring Senior Executive Service candidates across the IC. They loosely tied to the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) largely because funding from that effort could offset the cost of backfilling rotational assignments within DoD. The governing board included representatives from across the IC, as well as the OUSD (P&R). Performance-Based Compensation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency During the same period, NGA (first known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) was created to bring together six predecessor organizations with disparate civilian personnel systems. NGA chose a single HR system to streamline administration and establish its identity. In 1998, the Office of the Secretary of Defense authorized NGA to conduct a five year pilot test that was later extended. Widely regarded as a success, the “Total Pay Compensation” program substantially influenced the design of the ODNI Pay Modernization framework and provided underlying principles for what would become DCIPS. By the time DCIPS was being considered for expansion to other intelligence components, NGA had almost a decade’s worth of experience with this type of performance-based management system. Post 9/11 Congressional Studies of the Intelligence Community The 9/11 terrorist attacks set in motion efforts to determine how the United States was caught by surprise and establish steps to prevent this type of attack from happening again. The first study, conducted by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, found that: The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Usama Bin Ladin’s plan to attack these United States on September 11, 2001. 10 The report continued: …Intelligence Community agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information prior to September 11. This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies’ missions, legal authorities, and cultures. 11 This was followed by the 2004 9/11 Commission report, which identified structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work: 10 Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Dec. 2002, p. 33. 11 Ibid, p. 77. 8
National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all- source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to “connect the dots.” No one component holds all the relevant information. 12 The Commission recommended the establishment of a National Intelligence Director that would have, among other powers, the authority to: …set personnel policies to establish standards for education and training and facilitate assignments…across agency lines. 13 Intelligence Reform Legislation With the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Congress adopted most of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, including creation of the DNI. This new position would report to the President and have broad responsibilities for intelligence issues, including the ability to establish HR policies for the IC that would serve the purposes of: • Encouraging and facilitating assignments and details of personnel…between elements of the intelligence community. • Setting standards for education, training, and career development of personnel of the intelligence community. • Encouraging and facilitating the recruitment and retention by the intelligence community of highly qualified individuals for the effective conduct of intelligence activities. • Ensuring that the personnel of the intelligence community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the collection and analysis of intelligence through the recruitment and training of women, minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. • Making service in more than one element of the intelligence community a condition of promotion to such positions within the intelligence community as the Director shall specify. • Ensuring the effective management of intelligence community personnel who are responsible for intelligence community-wide matters. 14 The ODNI would also “…prescribe, in consultation with…other agencies or elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective departments, personnel policies and 12 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report), 2004, p. 408. 13 Ibid, p. 414. 14 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act Of 2004, Sec. 102(A)(3)(f)(1-5), Public Law 108–458, 118 Stat. 3649, Dec. 17, 2004. 9
Page 1 and 2: A Report by a Panel of the NATIONAL
Page 3 and 4: FOREWORD The terrorist attacks of S
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD.........
Page 7 and 8: Governance ........................
Page 9 and 10: ACRONYMS Academy CWB DCIPS DIA DIHR
Page 11 and 12: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The terrorist att
Page 13 and 14: • It is too soon to draw conclusi
Page 15 and 16: CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY A
Page 17 and 18: • The adequacy of the training, p
Page 19 and 20: • Chapter 6: The Way Forward for
Page 21: CHAPTER 2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FO
Page 25 and 26: ewarded longevity over performance
Page 27 and 28: OTHERS FACTORS THAT IMPACTED DCIPS
Page 29 and 30: • Partisan politics could play an
Page 31 and 32: Administration (TSA), which operate
Page 33 and 34: NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
Page 35 and 36: CHAPTER 3 ASSESSING DCIPS’ DESIGN
Page 37 and 38: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING DCIPS’ DE
Page 39 and 40: Figure 3-1. Objectives of the NICCP
Page 41 and 42: PRINCIPLE The system is transparent
Page 43 and 44: The Defense Intelligence Enterprise
Page 45 and 46: discourage teamwork…to the organi
Page 47 and 48: Figure 3-2. DCIPS 2010 Pay Band Str
Page 49 and 50: enable managers and supervisors to
Page 51 and 52: they achieve their goals. Given the
Page 53 and 54: Element Definition Supervisory/Mana
Page 55 and 56: cooperation with ODNI. The review w
Page 57 and 58: Source: OUSD(I) Human Capital Manag
Page 59 and 60: eplaces the current government-wide
Page 61 and 62: esults, but the final DCIPS evaluat
Page 63 and 64: The Panel believes that adequate fu
Page 65 and 66: HOW DCIPS COMPARES TO THE GS/GG SYS
Page 67 and 68: Table 3-7. Comparison of DCIPS and
Page 69 and 70: Design Feature DCIPS NSPS quality s
Page 71 and 72: Recommendation 4. To ensure equitab
Page 73 and 74:
CHAPTER 4 ASSESSING DCIPS’ IMPLEM
Page 75 and 76:
Table 4-1. Overview of the OPM Obje
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In the DCIPS context, “leaders”
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intelligence component would do so.
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• Credible, timely, and original
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Finding 4-5 The DCIPS website and R
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Finding 4-6 The lack of a communica
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No training needs assessments have
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pay pool exercises to be helpful an
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• The Commerce Department used fo
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3. Implementing DCIPS; 4. Evaluatin
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created a separate document for som
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lack of an overall change strategy
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changed and by whom. 149 This appea
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How pay pools are constructed and w
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DCIPS survey results indicate that
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CONCLUSIONS The Panel finds that a
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CHAPTER 5 ASSESSING DCIPS’ IMPACT
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• Disincentives to become a super
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employees received performance rati
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Figure 5-1. DCIPS Interim Array of
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Table 5-1. NGA Indices and Comparat
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of implementation. Nonetheless, OUS
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CHAPTER 6 THE WAY FORWARD FOR DCIPS
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OUSD(I) has advised the Panel that
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CHAPTER 7 PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS Bas
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• Clarify and strengthen its guid
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Recommendation 23. OUSD(I) should d
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APPENDIX B APPENDIX A PANEL AND STA
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APPENDIX B Committee on U.S. Nation
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APPENDIX B PARTICIPATING INDIVIDUAL
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Michael Jackson*—President and Fo
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Defense Intelligence Agency Kendrea
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APPENDIX C APPENDIX C BIBLIOGRAPHY
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APPENDIX C Langbein, L. “The impa
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APPENDIX D APPENDIX D MERIT SYSTEMS
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APPENDIX D (10) Discriminating agai
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APPENDIX E APPENDIX E DCIPS PERFORM
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APPENDIX E EMPLOYEE NAME: _________
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APPENDIX E EMPLOYEE NAME: _________
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APPENDIX F APPENDIX F OPEN FORUM LO
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APPENDIX G APPENDIX G MITRE’S PER
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