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Tracking External Donor Funding.pdf - NDC

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Table 9: Sector Working Groups and Subgroups<br />

Sector Working Groups<br />

Agriculture<br />

Fiscal<br />

Private Sector Development<br />

Water and Sanitation<br />

Municipal Development and<br />

Local Governance<br />

Health<br />

Education<br />

Social Protection<br />

Judiciary<br />

Public Administration<br />

Civil Service<br />

Security<br />

Elections<br />

Energy and Electricity<br />

Environment<br />

Thematic Groups and Taskforces<br />

Fiscal Taskforce<br />

Micro Finance Taskforce<br />

National Nutrition Steering Committee, Pharmaceutical<br />

TG, Mental Health TG, Non-Communicable Diseases<br />

TG, Women's Health TG, Children's Health TG<br />

Higher Education TG<br />

2.3.3 The Critique of the Aid Coordination<br />

Structure<br />

Though the sheer amount of aid entering the WB&GS<br />

requires a system of external aid coordination, questions<br />

still remain about the effectiveness of this structure in<br />

responding to Palestinian needs and priorities, and the<br />

ability of Palestinian Ministries to put forward a<br />

competent agenda to guide donors, as opposed to follow<br />

them.<br />

The blame for this cannot be entirely placed upon the<br />

door of international donors though. While the donors<br />

have changed the system to align with the principles of<br />

aid effectiveness outlined in the Paris Declaration, the<br />

ongoing occupation and political instability in the PA<br />

have ensured that decision making power still rests in the<br />

hands of donors at the capital level. Even with the<br />

structural changes, and even with a competent stable PA,<br />

the same client-recipient relationship would remain<br />

(Khan, 2003). After all, it is the donor who gives the<br />

money, or not, as the case may be. The response to the<br />

election victory of Hamas in 2006 is only too clear an<br />

example of donor’s political agendas overriding their<br />

development strategies.<br />

There is another important criticism of the system of aid<br />

coordination: it largely fails to include Palestinian<br />

NGOs 26 . Though critical to development, these<br />

organizations have little say in the overall direction of<br />

aid at the strategic levels. While International NGOs are<br />

represented through AIDA, the Palestinian NGO<br />

Network (PINGO) has continually asked the AHLC for<br />

more representation and access to technical<br />

information 27 .<br />

26<br />

27<br />

A few PNGOs, such as MAS, are given ‘observer’ status within<br />

SWGs. However the numbers are low and the placement is not<br />

fixed. The ability to do little more than observe has meant that<br />

attendance is low for the small number of PNGOs invited to the<br />

table.<br />

For an expanded and critical account of the Aid coordination<br />

system, see: Brynen, 2000: chapter 4, Le More, 2004 and Khan et<br />

al., 2004.<br />

20

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