Tracking External Donor Funding.pdf - NDC

3.8.7 In Focus: PNGO Hierarchies
The fact that PNGOs have not distributed themselves along the same lines as donors and contributions does not mean that
those outside of the Central West Bank are forgotten by international aid. The geographical structure of aid, as detailed in
the Figure 40 above, tells the story of a developing hierarchy amongst local organizations. Large professionalized PNGOs
working on a regional or national basis are overwhelmingly located in the Central West Bank. In 2007, 29.6% of NGOs in
the Central West Bank claimed to work at the national level, as opposed to only 4.9% in the north, 9% in the South and
7.8% in the Gaza Strip (MAS, 2007:74). These powerful, nationally oriented organizations act as patrons to smaller
PNGOs or CBOs spread throughout the remainder of Palestine – often serving as conduits of donor aid, capacity builders,
ad-hoc project contractors or oversight and administrative support.
An example of the hierarchy of aid extending to the local level could be when a donor government provides funding to the
Welfare Association, an INGO, who in turn gives money to the NGO Development Center (NDC), a Palestinian NGO that
often acts as a donor to smaller local organizations. Among the dozens of PNGO partners of NDC is The Palestinian Center
for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), an NGO located in Ramallah who works with and through smaller PNGOs and CBOs
through a network of offices in the West Bank. In such a scenario, there would be three intermediary steps between the
donor and the implementing agency.
3.9 Arab Funding to PNGOs
When setting out to track external funding to PNGOs,
the team at MAS worked to better understand the
relatively small percentage of aid arriving from Arab
governments and institutions. The following section
reviews two important reports on Arab funding to the
WB&GS, as well as the findings of our survey.
According to Dr. Malhis (2007), Arab aid to Palestine is
characterized by its solidarity with the Palestinian cause
and liberation movement. From the 1940s until 1967,
remained reactive to the severity of the economic,
political and social conditions in the oPT while lacking
an overall framework.
After the 1967 war, Arab countries’ priorities shifted
from helping in the liberation of Palestine toward
eliminating the war’s effects. Following the 1973 war,
countries gathered at the seventh League of Arab States
Summit where they pledged to give countries 'on the
front line' (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO) 1.369
Billion USD annually. At the time this represented a far
higher amount than their Western counterparts.
Following the signing of the Camp David Peace
Agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978, attendees
of the ninth Arab League Summit pledged to allocate 150
Million USD to Palestine annually over ten years.
Although detailed data is not available, the joint
Palestinian-Jordanian Committee reported to have
received around 422.6 Million USD between 1979 and
1985, only 40.2% of the pledged amounts, and 29.5% of
total pledges (10 years at 150 Million USD/yr).
Between 1988 and 1993, following the onset of the first
Intifada, the League of Arab States pledged immediate
support of 128 Million USD to Palestine along with a 43
Million USD stipend per month. However, the onset of
the first Gulf War between the United States and Iraq,
prevented most of these pledges from turning into
disbursements. It is estimated that transfers between
1988 and 1992 totaled to around 103 Million USD, most
of which went to emergency aid and medicines. This
number represents a far cry from the promised monthly
stipend of over 40 Million USD.
The period between 1994 and 2000 saw another shift in
Arab country aid giving, influenced by the Oslo Accords
and the push to support the nascent PA. Between 1994
and 1996, Arab aid reached around 393.4 Million USD,
only about 15.6% of the total aid. The MoP on the other
hand, reports that between 1994 and 2000, Arab aid
totaled 7.3% of total aid to Palestinians 50 . Regardless of
the differences in estimates, both clearly show that Arab
funding was becoming increasingly limited and
marginalized in comparison to its Western counterparts.
Between 2001 and 2007, Arab funding saw a dramatic
rise. Between 3.96 Billion USD was committed as direct
budget support and total commitments reached 5.11
Billion USD.
The major increase in funding followed on the eruption
of the Second Intifada and the intensified occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza. Arab countries convened an
emergency summit in Cairo where they created two
funds: The Al Quds Intifada Fund (200 Million USD)
and the Al-Aqsa Fund (800 Million USD). The following
year in 2002, an additional 150 Million USD was
pledged to those two funds.
However, actual disbursements are different than
pledges. The actual contributions to the two funds totaled
around 761.8 Million USD, representing only 66.2% of
the total pledges. Moreover, of the disbursements made,
89% came from only five countries (Saudi Arabia at
50
It should be noted that the PAMS system and the previous MoPIC
inaccurately captured the data of many multi-lateral instruments
and foundations.
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