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Annual Report and Accounts - Hemscott IR

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TRAVIS PERKINS ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2012<br />

Purpose <strong>and</strong><br />

link to strategy Operation Performance metrics<br />

Deferred share bonus plan<br />

Rewards<br />

achievement of<br />

annual financial<br />

<strong>and</strong> key business<br />

strategy objectives.<br />

Rewards personal<br />

performance<br />

measured against<br />

key objectives.<br />

Deferred element<br />

encourages longer<br />

term shareholding.<br />

Clawback <strong>and</strong><br />

forfeiture provisions<br />

discourage excessive<br />

risk taking <strong>and</strong><br />

short term outlook<br />

ensuring that<br />

executive <strong>and</strong><br />

shareholder interests<br />

are aligned.<br />

Targets are set annually in line with the<br />

performance metrics (see aside).<br />

Relative weighting of metrics subject to<br />

discretion of Committee annually.<br />

Total bonus level is determined after the year<br />

end, based on achievement of targets.<br />

50% of the total bonus will be paid in cash within<br />

4 months of the year end.<br />

Remainder of total bonus deferred in share bonus<br />

bank. No withdrawals from bonus bank until<br />

after year 2.<br />

From year 3, annual withdrawal of 50% of shares<br />

held in bonus bank.<br />

Shares in bonus bank subject to clawback <strong>and</strong><br />

forfeiture.<br />

For 2013 the maximum opportunity will be<br />

CEO 180%<br />

DCEO 150%<br />

GFD 150%<br />

There will be no increases to these percentages in<br />

future years without prior shareholder approval.<br />

Bonus measures <strong>and</strong> weightings:<br />

EPS 50%<br />

ROCE 30%<br />

Business strategy 20%<br />

Financial targets based on group <strong>Annual</strong> Operating Plan<br />

(‘AOP’) with no bonus paid if outcome is less than 95% of AOP.<br />

The target bonus levels are 50% of the maximum.<br />

Shares held in the bonus bank are subject to forfeiture if target<br />

share prices are not achieved. Target share prices are based<br />

upon the average share price during the bonus year inclusive<br />

of a compounded long-term equity rate of return (currently<br />

8%).<br />

The banked shares are split into two equal tranches. Tranche<br />

1 vests if after one year, by comparison to the highest 30 day<br />

average share price during the period, the target share price<br />

is met. If the target share price is not met 50% of tranche 1 is<br />

forfeited.<br />

Tranche 2 vests if after two years, by comparison to the<br />

highest 30 day average share price during the period, the<br />

target share price is met. If the target share price is not met at<br />

the end of two years 50% of tranche 2 is forfeited.<br />

In determining achievement of target share prices dividends<br />

paid per share during the period will be added.<br />

Performance share plan<br />

Incentivises<br />

participants to<br />

deliver key financial<br />

targets over a longer<br />

term.<br />

Helps retain top<br />

quality executives.<br />

Share matching scheme<br />

Awards, in the form of nil-cost options, are made<br />

annually to participants.<br />

Awards vest after 3 years subject to achievement<br />

of performance measures (see aside).<br />

Participants will only participate if they meet the<br />

shareholding requirements set by the Committee.<br />

The maximum annual award for all executive<br />

directors is 150% of salary.<br />

Performance measures <strong>and</strong> weightings are:<br />

EPS growth 40%<br />

Aggregate cashflow 40%<br />

Relative TSR 20%<br />

Cashflow targets are set for each award based on the Group’s<br />

projections for the next 3 years.<br />

From 2013 TSR awards made will be measured against the<br />

FTSE 50 to 150 index better reflecting the position of the<br />

business.<br />

EPS growth has to be a minimum of 3% p.a. in addition to RPI<br />

over 3 years with full vesting at 10% p.a. plus RPI.<br />

GOVERNANCE<br />

Encourages<br />

participants to build<br />

up a shareholding in<br />

the company.<br />

Incentivises<br />

participants to<br />

deliver key financial<br />

targets over a longer<br />

term.<br />

Helps retain top<br />

quality executives.<br />

Participants are invited to participate annually.<br />

Each participant buys shares from their own<br />

resources with a value of up 50% of their post-tax<br />

base salary.<br />

Matching share award on a 2:1 basis made to<br />

each participant.<br />

Matching share award is in the form a nil-cost<br />

option which will vest after 3 years subject to<br />

achievement of performance target (see aside).<br />

Performance target is Cash Return on Capital Employed<br />

(CROCE).<br />

Vesting range is based on company’s projections for next 3<br />

years.<br />

Shareholding requirements<br />

Aligns the interests<br />

of executives <strong>and</strong><br />

shareholders.<br />

Formal requirements (not voluntary guidelines)<br />

apply to directors <strong>and</strong> senior executives.<br />

Participation in long-term incentives will be<br />

scaled back, or withheld, if the requirements are<br />

not met <strong>and</strong> maintained.<br />

From 2013, executive directors are required to hold<br />

shares valued at two times salary within 5 years.<br />

None.<br />

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