The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers

"
"
mere
THE EPICUREAN CONTRAST 125
knowledge is possible. In all knowledge, there is a
mental element that must be taken account of, as well
as a sense element ;
and the native activity of the mind
is a fundamental fact that must be duly appraised.
Hence the Stoic s insistence on the mind s assent in
knowledge, and of the power it has of grasping reality
and truth in the various ways laid down in his Epistemology,
as we have detailed in Chapter IV.
Nor is the Epicurean doctrine of free will very
satisfactory.
It was vigorously attacked in ancient times (as we
see in Cicero, for example), and the Stoics opposed it.
And there is real ground for this. Although the theory
may
be said to be in
line with that of unconscious will
in Schopenhauer, it is far from impregnable. No light
is really thrown upon the problem by simply designat
ing the power of declination in the material atoms
"will";
nor is man s volitional freedom explained
by being referred back to such declination. If the
bonds of fate are to be broken, it certainly cannot be
done in this way. To subsume two such things as the
unconscious swerving of dead material particles from
the vertical and the intensely conscious purposive
determination of a man in
making a choice, under the
same category "will,"
seems very like juggling with
words. There is no true explanation in this ;
and
Aristotle s criticism of Plato s Ideas at once suggests
itself as applicable here
empty talk and
picturesque metaphor (Kei/oAoyctv eort KCU /xcra^opas