The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers

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THE STOIC CREED
lent the weight of their authority to
doubtful practices
as when Penaetius, if Cicero is to be relied on,
justified the advocate or patronus in his practice
of defending the plausible, even when it was not
true.
Again, the Stoics (as we have already seen) had by
and by to admit that there are degrees in virtue and
in vice, as well as in pleasure and in pain. And
when they perfected their teaching of Altruism, and
emphasized the fact that every man is a citizen of the
world, with privileges and obligations corresponding,
they paid homage to the affections in a way that
struck at the root of their fundamental dogma. Their
system now became far more effective, but it became
inconsistent.
So, in like manner, their doctrine of moral progress
(TT/ao/coTnj, profectus], and their counsel of daily selfexamination
(after the manner of the Pythagoreans),
carried faithfully out by the conscientious Stoic, so as
to gauge his shortcomings and stir him up to amend
ment, were concessions to practical human needs, and
gave working power to what might otherwise have
1
been an inoperative abstract teaching. If men can
advance in character, if habits may be formed and
count for much, 2
"
if the foolish may become
wise,"
there are degrees in virtue and in vice ;
and, as virtue
is
by degrees contracted, vice is by degrees abandoned.
That is not a doctrine of theoretical perfection, but a
fact of moral experience ;
and the recognition of it
gave
a great fulcrum to Stoic Ethics.
1
See Epictetus, Diss. i.
4 ; iii. 2.
2
See Epictetus s wise handling- of habit in Diss, ii. 18.