The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers

64 THE STOIC CREED
The later Stoics must be, so far, separated from the
earlier in this matter, that they were much less enthusi
astic for logical studies. Practical interests engrossed
their attention, and the clamant corruption of the
Roman Empire naturally left them with little inclination
to pursue abstract subjects that had only a distant
reference to conduct. Hence, Epictetus often speaks
disparagingly of the power of resolving syllogisms, and
of dealing with hypothetical arguments, as compared
with the power over oneself and the right use of
l
appearances ; and in Marcus Aurelius there is scarcely
a reference to formal logic at all.
Two points, however, deserve to be specially noted
on the side of the Stoic Logic. One is the view of
Logic, in its negative aspect, as a safeguard against
error. This, no doubt, is but the reverse side of the
positive characteristic that logic
deals with truth and
is an aid to correct thinking ;
but the prominence that
the Stoics gave to it is testimony to their appreciation
of the power of falsehood over men and the tendency of
human nature to fall into error. If correct reasoning
did not imply the possibility of reasoning incorrectly,
logic would be a useless science ;
but if men may
err in
their thinking, then it becomes of the utmost import
ance that they be equipped against such error, for the
consequences of mistake are frequently disastrous.
Hence, while quite alive to the fact that logical training
sharpens the intellect and gives nimbleness to thought,
the Stoics laid the stress upon its negative function
upon its power to expose and refute fallacies. They
accepted it as furthering truth ;
but they valued it
1
See, e.g.) Diss. iii. 24.