The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers
The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers
The Stoic Creed - College of Stoic Philosophers
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"<br />
154 THE STOIC CREED<br />
connexion with their famous distinction <strong>of</strong> the two<br />
kinds <strong>of</strong> Duty<br />
"the suitable" or<br />
fitting"<br />
and "the<br />
right," Ko.OrjK.ov and Karop&ojua, a distinction (together<br />
with the elaborate working out <strong>of</strong> it)<br />
that entitled them<br />
to be regarded as the originators <strong>of</strong> what Bentham calls<br />
Deontology or the science <strong>of</strong> duty. Indeed, the term<br />
"duty" (KaOrJKov) is said to have been first employed<br />
in the technical ethical sense by Zeno, who wrote a<br />
treatise On Duty (Diog. Laert. vii. 2I). 1 But duty, as<br />
KaOfJKov, is simply the suitable or fitting, and not that<br />
absolute rule <strong>of</strong> right<br />
that the term designates to-day.<br />
It is applicable only to things "indifferent" (<strong>of</strong>ficium<br />
medium), and signifies any action in everyday<br />
meets a want or serves a purpose, any line <strong>of</strong> conduct<br />
life that<br />
for which a reason may be given. It is not, therefore,<br />
strictly speaking, "virtue,"<br />
which moves in a different<br />
and a higher sphere. Strict virtue is<br />
/caTo/&gt;0a&gt;yua (honestum,<br />
or rectum^ or <strong>of</strong>ficiu<br />
m perfectuni] duty in its purest form,<br />
which is not simply conformity to right reason, but con<br />
formity which flows from the will, the full<br />
knowledge,<br />
and the simple intention <strong>of</strong> the wise man. Hence, in<br />
this specific sense, and from the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> abstract<br />
theory, virtue is indivisible : there cannot be degrees <strong>of</strong><br />
it. <strong>The</strong>re can be degrees only in things<br />
that have<br />
relative value ;<br />
but virtue has absolute worth it is to<br />
be sought for its own sake, and is the same under all<br />
circumstances. It is not, therefore, a "habit<br />
(?is),"<br />
as Aristotle had taught<br />
it can neither diminish nor<br />
increase: it is, in distinctive <strong>Stoic</strong> terminology, a<br />
1 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Stoic</strong> s mode <strong>of</strong> handling Duty, in all its practical detail,<br />
including the seasonable and decorous (decorum, TO trptirov} in<br />
conduct, may be seen in Cicero s De Officiis.