Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre

The headquarters of the Japanese north China area army . . . commandedthe first army to strike against the Chinese force on the southern bank ofthe Yellow River in the upstream of Jinan starting mid-February. As aresult of this operation, the Japanese army extended its control over thesouthern part of the Shanxi province and the left bank area of the YellowRiver estuary in the Henan province.The first army’s occupation was, however, tenuous because a sizablenumber of Chinese troops fled into the mountain regions in the Shanxiprovince, joined hands with the Communists who had maintained theirbases there, and posed threats to the Japanese occupied areas. Althoughthe first army dealt a substantial degree of blow to these Chinese forcesthrough its counter-insurgency operations from mid-March to late April, itwas unable to achieve its initially set objective. In particular, the firstarmy’s campaign stopped short of launching an offensive against theCommunists based in the vicinity of Wutaishan and in the north of Luan.As a result, the first army needed to conduct more intensive anti-guerrillacampaigns in order to stabilize the security in these regions.According to Shina jihen shashin zenshū [Complete Picture Collection of TheSino-Japanese War], no. 3, the Japanese troops occupied Tunliu on February 21, 1938.Yet, the Defense Agency’s military history series clearly states that the Japanese army’soperation “stopped short of launching offensive against . . . the north of Luan,” whichincludes Tunliu. The premature termination of the Japanese campaign allowed theCommunists to operate in these areas quite intensively.Deployment of GMD regularforces and CCP troopsArea controlled by GMDregular forces as of the end ofOctober 1938Area under the control of theCCP regular army andguerrillas units120