Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre

For example, combatants who are captured in uniforms should be accorded thestatus of POW. As Rumsfeld said, combatants who satisfy those four qualifications asdefined under international law will be guaranteed to live including after they are underthe opponent’s custody. But those who discarded their uniforms are regarded asillegitimate combatants and cannot to be classified as POWs and are not entitled toprivileges thereof.Obviously, the Chinese combatants after the fall of Nanking belonged to the lattercategory. They removed insignias and uniforms that could have distinguishedthemselves from non-combatants, and made their way to the safety zone where almost allthe civilians remaining in Nanking took refuge. They were clearly illegitimatecombatants and did not qualify for protection specified in international conventions. Thus,none of the Westerners living in Nanking made a statement that claimed that the Japaneseexecuted “POWs.” Neither was such a contention advanced at the IMTFE.The Japanese execution of rebellious-looking ex-Chinese combatants was awell-known fact among all the parties involved—the Westerners, the Japanese military,the Chinese soldiers, and the civilian population in the city. Even if they did notpersonally witness such executions, they surely heard rumors about them. Also, thisfact was likely familiar to the peoples of Western countries and of Japan. If suchexecutions in the course of the “mop-up” operation had been deemed illegal, there wouldhave been an immediate international outcry against Japan. But, at the time, no suchaccusation was leveled against her.The “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians,” which was later edited,compiled and published as the Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, contains a casenumber 185. What is notable about this particular case is its side note, which states,“We have no right to protest about legitimate executions by the Japanese army.” Since“legitimate” means “in accordance with established principles or standards,” one mayrephrase this passage as “We have no right to protest about executions by the Japanesearmy that observed the principles of the conventions governing belligerencies.”The case 185 was reported on January 9, 1938. Thus, one may conclude that theICNSZ determined the Japanese executions to be lawful in the light of the internationallaws on belligerencies as of this date. Notably, no Westerners made their references tothe executions in their written records thereafter. As an article in the 2003 edition ofNankin “gyhakusatsu” kenkyū no saizensen [The Front Line of Research on the Nanking“Massacre” 2003](p. 287) noted, the absence of an accusation accrued from universalrecognition by the people in Nanking that the Japanese executions were legallyjustifiable.Those accustomed to the norms of peace time might have no qualm aboutgranting the status of “ordinary civilian” to military men who stripped themselves ofuniforms. But under the laws of belligerencies, combatants remain so until they areformally discharged.One fact must also be emphasized here: the Japanese army did not execute all thecaptured Chinese combatants. The Japanese military used many of them as a laborforce, and they numbered about 10,000 by the end of February, 1938.( [ The Front Lineof Research on the Nanking “Massacre” 2004](p. 90) Some of them were registered ascivilians.For example, Major-General Liu Qixiong, who is mentioned in [The Ttruth of the31