Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre

At the time, the Chinese Communists were desperately attempting to turnChiang Kai-shek’s military might on the Japanese. According Tokyo Sabin KyakkaMiteisyutu Bengogawa Shiryo [Defense Evidence Rejected by the International MilitaryTribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)] Vol.5 (p.505) edited by Tokyo Tribunal SourceMaterial Publishing Group, Mao Zedong of the CCP issued the “declaration of waragainst Japan” several times, beginning in 1932. From 1935 onward, he continued toappeal to the nation for the “expansion” of “anti-Japanese national war” as well as the“initiation of resistance war against Japan.”Then, one event changed the entire political picture in China. On December 12,1936, Chiang Kai-shek was visiting the city of Sian to encourage Zhang Xueliang, a sonof Zhang Zuolin, to intensify his military offensive against the Communists. Zhang,however, captured Chiang and put him under house arrest. Chiang Kai-shek was laterreleased when he agreed to terminate the GMD’s war against the Communists and givepriority to wage war against Japan. On July 7 of the following year, a military clashbetween the Japanese and the Chinese occurred in the area close to the Marco PoloBridge in a suburb of Beijing, and from this minor skirmish ultimately developed afull-scale war between the two countries.On the night of July 7, a Japanese army unit that was conducting a drill in thearea, using blanks as usual instead of live ammunition. At 10:40 p.m., the Japanese unitcame under fire -- with live bullets. As historian Hata Ikuhiko said in his Rokōkyō Jikenno Kenkyu [Study on Marco Polo Bridge Incident] published in 1998, it was the men ofthe Chinese 29th Army that fired those shots. Had the Chinese troops opened fire onlyonce, their act could have been excused as an accident. Yet, because they aimed shots atJapanese troops three more times thereafter, the commander of the Japanese troopsinterpreted it as an act of provocation. Finally on July 8, 5:30 a.m., after the Japanesetroops came under fire for the fourth time, they launched a counterattack.Later in the same month, when a Japanese battalion was about to enter the city ofBeijing to reinforce the Japanese garrison there (which was then comprised of only twocompanies) under an agreement reached with the Chinese authorities in the city, Chinesesoldiers closed one of the city walls gates and fired upon them. A Chinese securityforce stationed in Tongzhou then massacred over 200 Japanese civilians living in the city.The Japanese government was ready to start negotiations in Shanghai on August9 with its Chinese counterpart to settle outstanding issues, including these incidents. Atthis point, the Japanese leadership overall was not at all intent on expanding the militaryconflict in China.Then on that very day, the conflict spread to Shanghai when Lieutenant JuniorGrade Ōyama Isao and a sailor of the Japanese Imperial Navy’s landing force were killedby the Chinese security force in the city. The resulting battle in Shanghai attractedinternational attention since the city also contained the international settlements of theWestern powers including Britain, the United States, France, and Italy. This was anideal environment for Chiang Kai-shek to fulfill his intention of promoting and exploitinganti-Japanese feeling among the Westerners, and he was ultimately successful.Protecting some 30,000 Japanese residents in Shanghai were only 2,500 officersand sailors of the Japanese navy’s landing force. As for Chiang Kai-shek, he had issueda mobilization order earlier on July 12, and had ten divisions of his central army deployedin the Shanghai area even before the start of the Battle of Shanghai on August 9. By14