oilers. <strong>The</strong>y also launched effective marketing campaigns.In contrast, the other six companies abandoned or deemphasizedthe new boilers, for a variety <strong>of</strong> reasons. <strong>The</strong>y wereless able to keep costs down, and customers were not willingto pay a 20 percent premium for the new boilers, beingdistrustful <strong>of</strong> the promised three-year payback. As noted,the markets were increasingly restricted by environmentalrules. And finally, some companies found more lucrativemarkets, such as waste heat recovery, in a rapidly changingmarket.Two successful technology recipientsimproved the designs and reduced costs;six others abandoned or deemphasized theboilers.At appraisal, the project’s intention was that “[t]echnologiesthat are proven to be technically and commerciallysuccessful will be disseminated to other boiler producersin China” (<strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> 1996), a key avenue <strong>of</strong> technologydiffusion. However, an IEG survey found that none <strong>of</strong> themanufacturers deliberately licensed or retransferred theirtechnologies to other firms, fearing competition. <strong>The</strong> mostsuccessful firm reported the existence <strong>of</strong> unauthorized copies<strong>of</strong> their designs, so some informal diffusion may haveoccurred, but the quantity and efficiency <strong>of</strong> the copies arenot known.Data are lacking on the performance <strong>of</strong> the auxiliary equipmentmanufacturers. However, one <strong>of</strong> the grate manufacturershas been successful, because the new grates are notmuch more expensive than traditional ones but <strong>of</strong>fer significantfuel savings.None <strong>of</strong> the manufacturers licensed orretransferred their technologies to otherfirms, limiting the overall impact.Meanwhile, the government has imposed new mandatorystandards for boilers, effective 2010, that are somewhat lessstringent than the boiler project’s design standards.Renewable Energy <strong>Development</strong> Project<strong>The</strong> Chinese REDP (1999–2008) provides an interestingcounterpoint to the Efficient Boiler Project. Another largetechnology transfer project, REDP emphasized support fordomestic research and development and manufacturingcompetence rather than licensing <strong>of</strong> foreign IPRs. With $40million from an IBRD loan and a GEF grant, the projectfocused primarily on establishing a sustainable market forrural solar home systems (SHS). It aimed to do so by overcomingbarriers to commercialization: inexperience <strong>of</strong> localmanufacturers, poor quality products, and high marketprices.REDP spurred manufacturer capabilitiesthrough quality-contingent outputsubsidies.REDP used a combination <strong>of</strong> technical assistance, incentives,and subsidies to boost the capabilities <strong>of</strong> the smallscaleSHS manufacturers. SHS manufacture is a relativelylow-tech assembly business carried out in small workshops.A nascent industry already existed, including spin-<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> aformer government research institute in Xining. But manufacturingcosts were high and SHS reliability low.REDP <strong>of</strong>fered a $1.50/Wp subsidy for manufacturing, contingenton meeting quality standards including componentquality. To help companies meet those standards, it providedpartial funding for company proposals to improve financialmanagement, quality control, and marketing practices,and to adapt and develop technologies. <strong>The</strong> technologiesinvolved were modest but crucial. For instance, some companiesdeveloped improved charge controllers—the apparatusthat prevents batteries from being overcharged andis thus essential for SHS life and performance. <strong>The</strong>se wereadapted to operating conditions typical <strong>of</strong> the high plateauswhere customers lived.<strong>The</strong> project resulted in lower costs forlarger systems, growth <strong>of</strong> firms in size andcompetence, and improved technology.<strong>The</strong> combination <strong>of</strong> financing, incentives, and technicalassistance was effective.• SHS costs declined for larger systems. <strong>The</strong> project improvedfirms’ quality control, reducing wastage; mayhave contributed to greater scale economies at the firmlevel; and reduced mark-ups as competition increased.• Firms grew. Employment in monitored companies morethan doubled over 2002–07, and sales increased 363percent.• Firms became more competent, and quality improved. Allbut two <strong>of</strong> the 17 participating firms received ISO 9001certification. Seventy-four component suppliers wereREDP certified.• Technology improved. <strong>The</strong> technology improvement programsupported 197 proposals, with an average grant <strong>of</strong>$17,500. <strong>The</strong> project reported that among 81 auditedprojects, 95 percent achieved their objectives.As in the case <strong>of</strong> the Efficient Boiler Project, projectsupportedtechnologies became proprietary and were notshared among companies. This might spur technologicalcompetition but may sacrifice opportunities for industrywideadvancement. <strong>The</strong> REDP model is now being appliedto the more expensive and technologically sophisticated68 | Climate Change and the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Group
goal <strong>of</strong> promoting wind turbine improvements, under theChina Renewable Energy Scale-Up Project.IFC support for technology transfer and deploymentOver the past 15 years, IFC has mounted a number <strong>of</strong> initiativesto invest equity, technical assistance, or both in start-upor early-stage clean technology ventures. Mostly funded bythe GEF, these initiatives have targeted both precommercialand commercial technologies. <strong>The</strong>se high-risk ventures havefit uneasily within IFC’s generally conservative, risk-averseculture and indeed many have had a disappointing record.A sequence <strong>of</strong> mostly unsuccessful projects,financed by GEF and implemented byIFC, has supported high-risk, small-scalerenewable energy enterprises.A sequence <strong>of</strong> mostly unsuccessful GEF-financed projectshas supported small-scale renewable energy enterprises.<strong>The</strong>se include the following:• <strong>The</strong> IFC-GEF Small and Medium Enterprise Program.In 1995, a $20 million initiative funded by GEF to increasethe markets <strong>of</strong> SMEs in the areas <strong>of</strong> climate changemitigation. <strong>The</strong> program provided loans <strong>of</strong> $500,000 to$1 million to various intermediaries and private companiesfor on-lending to SMEs. Though the program wasnot designed specifically to target the solar photovoltaicsector, it included six solar photovoltaic-related investments.Although solar photovoltaic proved to be too riskyfor most financial intermediaries, the SME program wasable to place funds in other technologies and sectors.• Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund. In 1997, thisfund was designed to place equity and debt investmentsin projects using renewable energy and energy efficiencytechnologies. But it had difficulty developing a projectpipeline, failing to meet modest targets. Developed as aconsortium, the division <strong>of</strong> responsibility among participantcompanies was unclear. Having made only one investment,the project was restructured in 2006 and foldedinto the Sustainable Energy Facility (see below).• Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative. In1998, IFC launched the $30 million PhotovoltaicMarket Transformation Initiative to provide concessionalfinance and grants. <strong>The</strong> program was designedto accelerate the sustainable commercialization andfinancial viability <strong>of</strong> solar photovoltaic technologyin India, Kenya, and Morocco. Early Initiative effortstook too long to materialize and required extensivedocumentation that proved to be too burdensome forsmall investments. In addition, the photovoltaic SMEswere operating with thin margins. <strong>The</strong> project wasrestructured in 2004 and aimed at industry-level ratherthan project-level capacity building. Results have beenpoor in Kenya and Morocco (IFC 2007). In India, theemphasis has shifted from SHSs to support for manufacturing<strong>of</strong> solar modules.• In 2001, IFC loaned $1 million to a private companyto invest in sustainable energy SMEs, especially thosethat <strong>of</strong>fered electricity to unelectrified households, providedback-up energy sources to companies, or lackedaccess to financing and technical advice. <strong>The</strong> companyfully disbursed the $1 million loan to eight sustainableenergy SMEs in Latin America and Africa to finance investmentsin fixed assets and working capital. Projectsfunded include solar water heaters, photovoltaic power,natural gas power, hydropower, and energy efficiencyimprovements.• <strong>The</strong> Solar <strong>Development</strong> Group, a $41 million initiativefunded by IFC and GEF, was initiated in 1999 with thegoal <strong>of</strong> increasing the delivery <strong>of</strong> SHS to rural householdsin developing countries. <strong>The</strong> group was comprised<strong>of</strong> two separate entities: Solar <strong>Development</strong> Capital, aprivate equity fund for private solar photovoltaic andsolar photovoltaic-related businesses, and the Solar <strong>Development</strong>Foundation, a nonpr<strong>of</strong>it entity that providedgrants for business development assistance. <strong>The</strong> Foundationraised $12 million and disbursed $2.2 million intechnical assistance to 63 projects. Solar <strong>Development</strong>Capital disbursed only $660,000 and was liquidated(IFC 2007). Overall, the project did little to meet theobjective <strong>of</strong> accelerating the growth <strong>of</strong> solar photovoltaicinstallations and closed in 2004.• Environmental Opportunities Facility. In 2002, IFC establishedthis facility to provide catalytic funding forinnovative ventures with the potential to increaseenvironmental sustainability and the need to overcomePhoto by Trevor Samson, courtesy <strong>of</strong> the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Photo Library.Special Topics | 69
- Page 1 and 2:
Phase II: The Challenge of Low-Carb
- Page 3 and 4:
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE WORLD BANK G
- Page 5 and 6:
Table of ContentsAbbreviations . .
- Page 7 and 8:
Figures1.1 GHG Emissions by Sector
- Page 9 and 10:
AcknowledgmentsThe report was prepa
- Page 11 and 12:
Executive SummaryUnabated, climate
- Page 13 and 14:
esettlement plans has been ineffect
- Page 15 and 16:
of some technologies, such as landf
- Page 17 and 18:
Scale up high-impact investmentsEne
- Page 19 and 20:
should have been strengthened in th
- Page 21 and 22:
Major monitorable IEGrecommendation
- Page 23 and 24:
Major monitorable IEGrecommendation
- Page 25 and 26:
Chairman’s Summary: Committee onD
- Page 27 and 28:
most places. Before we get there, w
- Page 29 and 30:
non-Annex I countries. The World Ba
- Page 31 and 32:
attention. In a couple of decades,
- Page 33 and 34:
GlossaryAdditionalityBankabilityBas
- Page 35 and 36:
Joint ImplementationA mechanism und
- Page 37 and 38:
Chapter 1evALuAtiOn HiGHLiGHts• T
- Page 39 and 40:
of interventions, from technical as
- Page 41 and 42:
would allow industrialized countrie
- Page 43 and 44:
growth, poverty reduction (includin
- Page 45 and 46:
Table 1.1 Map of the EvaluationSect
- Page 47 and 48:
Chapter 2eValuaTION HIGHlIGHTS• W
- Page 49 and 50:
Table 2.2Evaluated World Bank Renew
- Page 51 and 52:
Figure 2.2Breakdown of 2003-08 Low-
- Page 53 and 54: Table 2.4 Commitments to Grid-Conne
- Page 55 and 56: Box 2.1The Economics of Grid-Connec
- Page 57 and 58: on average (Iyadomi 2010). (Reducti
- Page 59 and 60: and industrial policy. An increasin
- Page 61 and 62: Table 2.6Hydropower Investments by
- Page 63 and 64: costs for remaining unelectrified a
- Page 65 and 66: World Bank experienceTwo factors ac
- Page 67: Box 2.5On-Grid and Off-Grid Renewab
- Page 70 and 71: Energy EfficiencyThe first phase in
- Page 72 and 73: Box 3.1ESCOs and Energy Performance
- Page 74 and 75: have had limited causal impact on t
- Page 76 and 77: measurement of achieved economic re
- Page 78 and 79: Since the early 1990s, public entit
- Page 80 and 81: part with a $198 million IDA credit
- Page 83 and 84: Chapter 4eVAluATioN HigHligHTS• B
- Page 85 and 86: The WBG urban transport portfolio (
- Page 87 and 88: y conventional transport systems, i
- Page 89 and 90: include the forest carbon projects
- Page 91 and 92: for Costa Rica for the period 2000-
- Page 93 and 94: After 20 years of effort, systemati
- Page 95 and 96: orrowers have demonstrated the abil
- Page 97 and 98: Chapter 5EVALuATioN HigHLigHTS• O
- Page 99 and 100: Consequently, the efficiency with w
- Page 101 and 102: technologies could accelerate diffu
- Page 103: A second issue, inherent to any adv
- Page 107 and 108: ConclusionsThe WBG’s efforts to p
- Page 109 and 110: Table 5.1Carbon Funds at the World
- Page 111 and 112: demonstration initiative. The Commu
- Page 113 and 114: Impacts on technology transferThe 2
- Page 115 and 116: Chapter 6Photo by Martin Wright/Ash
- Page 117 and 118: Figure 6.1800Economic and Carbon Re
- Page 119 and 120: Specifically, the WBG could:• Pla
- Page 121 and 122: Table 6.1Summary of Sectoral Findin
- Page 123 and 124: Table 6.1Sector Intervention Direct
- Page 125 and 126: Appendix ARenewable Energy Tables a
- Page 127 and 128: Table A.4Grid-Based Biomass/Biogass
- Page 129 and 130: Table A.5 (continued)Negative examp
- Page 131 and 132: Figure A.4A. Hydro/biomass capacity
- Page 133 and 134: Appendix bWorld Bank Experience wit
- Page 135 and 136: Table C.2Completed Low-Carbon Energ
- Page 137 and 138: TAble C.4Reviewed energy efficiency
- Page 139 and 140: the new capacity. Transmission syst
- Page 141 and 142: Table E.2Climate obligationsCoal Pl
- Page 143 and 144: Table F.2GHG objectiveModeNumber of
- Page 145 and 146: IEG eliminated a few cases of doubl
- Page 147 and 148: Table H.1Project andlocationBioener
- Page 149 and 150: Appendix ICarbon and Economic Retur
- Page 151 and 152: Appendix JRecent WBG Developments i
- Page 153 and 154: y providing value to standing fores
- Page 155 and 156:
never had an explicit corporate str
- Page 157 and 158:
overnight. The Bank can provide ass
- Page 159 and 160:
Chapter 51. From the chief economis
- Page 161 and 162:
Hartshorn, G., P. Ferraro, and B. S
- Page 163 and 164:
______. 2007. World Development Ind
- Page 165 and 166:
IEG PublicationsAnalyzing the Effec