Table 5.2Comparative Success at Registration<strong>of</strong> CDM Projects, WBG versus OtherSponsors and PurchasersWBGOtherRegistered projects, Oct 2009 69 1,765Ratio <strong>of</strong> rejected to registered 0 0.07Ratio <strong>of</strong> validation negative, terminated orwithdrawn to registered0.26 0.34Ratio <strong>of</strong> in process to registered 0.65 1.58Source: IEG tabulation, UNEP Risoe center as <strong>of</strong> October 2009.Note: CDM = Clean <strong>Development</strong> Mechanism; WBG = <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>Group.<strong>The</strong> CFU has been more successful insecuring CDM registration than othernon-WBG applicants.However, like previous observers, this evaluation finds thatthe size and timing <strong>of</strong> carbon credit purchases is far toosmall, in many cases, to plausibly constitute a make-or-breakinfluence on the decision to undertake a project. Instead,carbon funds constitute a mild additional inducement toinvestors that, statistically over the set <strong>of</strong> projects involved,may have contributed to some additional reductions.Poverty focusAs noted, the 2005 objectives called for ensuring thatsmaller, poorer countries benefited from the carbon market.This was inherently difficult, because these countrieshave very low levels <strong>of</strong> energy-related emissions to abate,but their deforestation and agriculture-related emissionsare ineligible under Kyoto rules.This mission was carried out largely by the Bio<strong>Carbon</strong>Fund and Community <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Carbon</strong> Fund,which comprise 8 percent <strong>of</strong> the overall portfolio. <strong>The</strong>sehave placed 39 percent <strong>of</strong> their purchases in low-incomecountries, as opposed to 0.3 percent for the other carbonfunds (table 5.3). However, these demonstration-orientedfunds experienced high preparation and supervisioncosts, along with implementation problems. Outside thelow-income countries, some projects (such as JepirachiWind Farm) provided benefits to indigenous or lowincomecommunities.<strong>The</strong> Bio<strong>Carbon</strong> Fund and Community<strong>Development</strong> <strong>Carbon</strong> Fund put 39 percent<strong>of</strong> their purchases in low-income countries;the other funds put 0.3 percent intolow-income countries.Table 5.3<strong>Carbon</strong> Projects with Signed Purchase AgreementsPCF CDCF Bio<strong>Carbon</strong> Fund National + umbrella TotalTotal project cost, a ($ millions) 975 781 265 5,246 7,266ERPA volume, million tons CO 2e 23 9 7 168 208Total volume, million tons CO 2e 60 17 70 515 663ERPA tons breakdown by country group (%)China 34 15 12 84 73JI (transition countries) 13 0 0 5 5<strong>Low</strong> income 2 42 35 0 3<strong>Low</strong>er middle income 25 41 38 6 11Upper middle income 26 3 14 5 8Total 100 100 100 100 100Total tons breakdown by country group (%)China 55 10 3 81 69JI (transition countries) 10 0 0 7 7<strong>Low</strong> income 1 49 74 0 9<strong>Low</strong>er middle income 12 36 21 5 8Upper middle income 22 5 2 5 7Total 100 100 100 100 100Source: <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> CFU data.Note: CDCF = Community <strong>Development</strong> <strong>Carbon</strong> Fund; CO 2e = carbon dioxide equivalent; ERPA = emissions reduction purchase agreement;PCF = Prototype <strong>Carbon</strong> Fund. Totals are not exact due to rounding.a. “Total project cost” refers to the investment cost <strong>of</strong> establishing the project, not to the purchase amount <strong>of</strong> carbon <strong>of</strong>fsets.76 | Climate Change and the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Group
Impacts on technology transfer<strong>The</strong> 2005 goals called for the CFU to “expand the technologyfrontiers <strong>of</strong> the carbon market to ensure that carbonfinance and carbon trade supports energy infrastructureand technology transfer.” Energy technology constitutesa minority <strong>of</strong> total CERs under contract. <strong>The</strong> largest energysubsectors are hydropower at 6 percent <strong>of</strong> the overallpost-2004 portfolio, landfill gas (6 percent), energyefficiency (4 percent), and methane avoidance (3 percent).Biomass, geothermal, and wind are about 1 percent each.<strong>The</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> emphasis on technology transfer varies.<strong>The</strong> CFU has had an active role in the diffusion <strong>of</strong> landfillgas technology. <strong>The</strong> Jepirachi Wind Farm Project was thefirst grid-connected wind farm in Colombia; its operationprovided useful lessons on adapting turbine operations tothe coastal region’s distinctive climate conditions (Pinilla,Rodriguez, and Trujillo 2009). In contrast, hydropowerwas already well established in Chile and China before the<strong>Bank</strong>’s carbon projects arrived in those countries.CDM project proponents must note technology transfer intheir project design document. Seres and Haites (2008) reviewedthese documents for all CDM projects in the pipelineas <strong>of</strong> June 2008. IEG reviewed the categorization <strong>of</strong> the59 WBG-sponsored projects in their database. Nineteenspecifically mentioned technology transfer, a slightly smallerproportion than the 36 percent in the overall sample. Ofthe 19, there were 6 landfill gas, 5 wind, 4 energy efficiency,2 biogas, and 2 industrial gas projects. Eight cases involvedequipment transfer only, 7 knowledge only, and 4 equipmentand knowledge. Nepal was the only low-incomecountry in this group.Almost two-thirds <strong>of</strong> the CERs under contract were forChinese reductions <strong>of</strong> HFC-23, a highly potent, industriallygenerated GHG. HFC-23 is a by-product <strong>of</strong> refrigerant productionand can be abated at very low cost. This purchasegenerated a large pulse <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fsets at a time when there wasincreasing pressure on the <strong>Bank</strong> to deliver them. Globally,HFC-23–based <strong>of</strong>fsets accounted for half <strong>of</strong> all CERs validatedin 2006, enabling the creation <strong>of</strong> a secondary marketand allowing CER-short companies to meet immediate carbonobligations.Almost two-thirds <strong>of</strong> carbon <strong>of</strong>fset purchaseswere for Chinese reductions <strong>of</strong> HFC-23, aby-product <strong>of</strong> refrigerant production.However, HFC-23 <strong>of</strong>fsets provoked concerns. As permittedby the CDM, the refrigerant companies realized a largepr<strong>of</strong>it on these transactions, subsequently taxed by Chinaat a 65 percent rate for development purposes. 5 However,critics say that carbon finance was unnecessary and inefficientfor this purpose, suggesting that the industries couldhave borne the cost or simply have been reimbursed for it,analogously to the Montreal Protocol 6 (Wara and Victor2008). <strong>The</strong>re was also concern that companies might enterthe refrigerant business merely to pr<strong>of</strong>it from HFC-23destruction, because destroying the by-product pays morethan creating the refrigerant. For this reason, UNFCCCrules were put in place to exclude new entrants from claimingemissions reductions. 7Implementation and benefitsFor most projects, the production <strong>of</strong> carbon <strong>of</strong>fsets is proportionalto the production <strong>of</strong> local benefits such as electricityor regrown forest volume. CDM monitoring reportsallow comparison <strong>of</strong> planned versus actual issuance <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>fsets. Looking at CDM-wide statistics, biogas, methanerecovery, cement, and transportation have performed farbelow expectations; for other technologies, there is widedispersion in planned versus actual performance.Chapter 2 discussed the performance <strong>of</strong> the 12 WBGcarbon-financed hydropower projects for which formalmonitoring information is available. Information is availablealso on 12 other WBG carbon projects (table A.6). Twolandfill gas projects have fared very poorly, with issuanceyields below 10 percent <strong>of</strong> planned levels (see box 2.2 onwhy landfill gas plans were too optimistic). Four other projectshad yields below 65 percent. <strong>The</strong> remainder performedas designed or better. Internal tracking <strong>of</strong> Bio<strong>Carbon</strong> Fundprojects shows that reforestation and afforestation are proceedingmore slowly than anticipated.Biogas, methane recovery, cement, andtransportation have performed belowexpectations, and for other technologiesthere is wide dispersion in planned versusactual performance.Integration with <strong>Bank</strong> activities<strong>The</strong> <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> has largely not realized synergies betweenoperations and carbon finance in the Kyoto Funds. Only 10<strong>of</strong> the 108 agreements are associated with <strong>Bank</strong> operations.For the operational part <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Bank</strong>, mainstreaming <strong>of</strong> carbonfinance is seen as too much trouble, because <strong>of</strong> the timeand hassle <strong>of</strong> arranging for project registration. In contrast,four proposed operations under the <strong>Carbon</strong> PartnershipFacility are grounded in existing <strong>Bank</strong> projects.Knowledge transfer and capacity building<strong>The</strong> carbon funds have supported CF Assist, a capacitybuildingprogram that advises countries on carbonregulation, sponsors a range <strong>of</strong> training, helps identify carbonprojects, and sponsors carbon trade fairs and expos.<strong>The</strong> annual carbon trade fair has been cited as an importantcontribution to information diffusion. Over 2006–09,Special Topics | 77
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Phase II: The Challenge of Low-Carb
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE WORLD BANK G
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Table of ContentsAbbreviations . .
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Figures1.1 GHG Emissions by Sector
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AcknowledgmentsThe report was prepa
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Executive SummaryUnabated, climate
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IEG PublicationsAnalyzing the Effec