Catalytic or demonstration impacts werestressed in the publicly stated goals <strong>of</strong> thePrototype <strong>Carbon</strong> Fund.Catalytic or demonstration impacts were stressed in thepublicly stated goals <strong>of</strong> the Prototype <strong>Carbon</strong> Fund (PCF)(<strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> 2001):1. Show how project-based greenhouse gas emission reductiontransactions can promote and contribute to sustainabledevelopment and lower the cost <strong>of</strong> compliancewith the Kyoto Protocol.2. Provide the parties to the UNFCCC, the private sector,and other interested parties with an opportunityto learn by doing in the development <strong>of</strong> policies, rules,and business processes for the achievement <strong>of</strong> emissionreductions under Joint Implementation and theCDM.3. Demonstrate how the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> can work in partnershipwith the public and private sector to mobilize newresources for its borrowing member countries whileit addresses global environmental problems throughmarket-based mechanisms.In 2005, the <strong>Bank</strong>’s Board endorsed a revised approach tocarbon finance, with three general objectives:• “To ensure that carbon finance contributes to sustainabledevelopment• To assist in building, sustaining, and expanding the internationalmarket for carbon emission reductions• To further strengthen the capacity <strong>of</strong> developing countriesto benefit from the emerging market for emissionreduction credits” (<strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> 2006).In 2005, the <strong>Bank</strong> Board endorsed a revisedapproach that articulated more specificgoals for the CFU.In addition, there were specific goals:• Continue to align carbon finance more closely withpoverty alleviation and locally sustainable development,ensuring that smaller, poorer countries benefitfrom carbon market development.• Expand the technology frontiers <strong>of</strong> the carbon marketto ensure that carbon finance and carbon trade supportenergy infrastructure and technology transfer.• Expand the <strong>Bank</strong>’s role in helping developing countriesdevelop and market portfolios <strong>of</strong> carbon assets directlyto OECD buyers, as a “lead buyer” that helps developa project but purchases only a fraction <strong>of</strong> its emissionreductions.• Ensure that there is a value added from carbon purchase,for instance, through the application <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> safeguards.• Achieve greater integration <strong>of</strong> carbon finance into themainstream <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> lending operations.• Reach out to other international finance institutionsand entities.• Improve pipeline <strong>of</strong> carbon finance projects.Inherent tensions among the various strategicand fiduciary goals have been resolvedin part through differentiation <strong>of</strong> funds.In addition to these overarching goals, the CFU wanted t<strong>of</strong>ully use its funds on behalf <strong>of</strong> participants, to support sustainabledevelopment in client countries, and to ensure anequitable division <strong>of</strong> benefits between participants and hostcountries.<strong>The</strong>re are inherent tensions among the various strategic andfiduciary goals:• Demonstration versus volume. Demonstration or pilotprojects tend to be risky and demanding in preparation.Under UNFCCC regulations, first-<strong>of</strong>-a-kind projectsrequire large fixed costs in methodology development.If, as is likely, these demonstration projects are small,the preparation cost per ton <strong>of</strong> CO 2will be high. Sothere is a trade-<strong>of</strong>f between demonstration (which benefitsa global community) and maximization <strong>of</strong> carboncredits (which benefits fund participants and recipientprojects).• Established versus less-established country locations. Thisis the same kind <strong>of</strong> trade-<strong>of</strong>f. “Frontier” projects incountries with less CDM experience are costlier to preparebut promote the geographic growth <strong>of</strong> the carbonmarket to poorer countries.• Stringent versus less-stringent additionality determination.As was recognized from the outset <strong>of</strong> the CDM,both buyers and sellers benefit from lax baselines—thatis, funding <strong>of</strong> projects that are not really additional. Butadditionality is difficult to determine, and screeningfor additionality has led to burdensome bureaucraticprocedures. So for the CFU there is a potential tensionbetween setting high standards for additionality demonstrationand maximizing carbon credit transactionvolumes.• High versus low CO price; agent <strong>of</strong> buyers or sellers.2In the early years <strong>of</strong> the PCF, the carbon market wasvery thin or nonexistent. Without an objective means<strong>of</strong> price discovery, determination <strong>of</strong> a “fair” price was achallenge for the PCF.<strong>The</strong>se conflicting pressures were resolved in part throughdifferentiation <strong>of</strong> funds. <strong>The</strong> PCF was launched as a74 | Climate Change and the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Group
demonstration initiative. <strong>The</strong> Community <strong>Development</strong><strong>Carbon</strong> Fund and the Bio<strong>Carbon</strong> Fund have strong, explicitdemonstration goals. <strong>The</strong> other Kyoto Funds are stronglyoriented toward helping developed countries secure carboncredits for compliance purpose. <strong>The</strong> newer initiatives, the<strong>Carbon</strong> Partnership Facility and Forest <strong>Carbon</strong> PartnershipFacility, return to the pioneering mode in seeking to demonstratenovel kinds <strong>of</strong> carbon transactions not yet recognizedunder Kyoto.<strong>The</strong> new facilities also feature equal representation <strong>of</strong> donorand host countries in fund governance. In contrast, earlierfunds were governed by a committee <strong>of</strong> the participants(donors), though in consultation with host countries.Catalytic impact on the carbon market<strong>The</strong> CFU played an important role in catalyzing the emergence<strong>of</strong> the market. Although there had been earliercarbon transactions (including Costa Rica’s pioneering sale<strong>of</strong> forest carbon credits), observers point to the PCF’s earlymobilization <strong>of</strong> funds and private sector investors as galvanizingthe realization that carbon markets were workable.<strong>The</strong> PCF invested heavily in developing monitoring andverification tools and in the legal apparatus for transacting<strong>of</strong>fsets, which were diffused among practitioners in theemerging market.<strong>The</strong> CFU was important in catalyzing theemergence <strong>of</strong> the carbon market and activein developing methodologies for carbon<strong>of</strong>fset measurement.<strong>The</strong> CFU was active in developing methodologies for carbon<strong>of</strong>fset measurement, though not uniquely so. As notedin box 5.2, development <strong>of</strong> a validation methodology is akind <strong>of</strong> public good: it cuts the development time, risk, andcost for all subsequent projects that use the same technology.In the first five rounds <strong>of</strong> the CDM’s MethodologicalPanel, the WBG was responsible for 12 <strong>of</strong> the 44 submittedmethodologies and for 6 <strong>of</strong> the 22 that were approved.Altogether, for large scale energy and transport technologies,the CFU has been involved in the preparation <strong>of</strong> 45 methodologies,<strong>of</strong> which 16 were eventually approved. Those methodologieshave been used so far in registered energy andtransport projects that are expected to produce 137 milliontons CO 2e, or about 10 percent <strong>of</strong> the CDM total for thesecategories. <strong>The</strong> CFU has also proposed most <strong>of</strong> the acceptedforestry methodologies, though there have been few otherusers <strong>of</strong> these and many small-scale methodologies. Currentwork on the Forest <strong>Carbon</strong> Partnership Facility and <strong>Carbon</strong>Partnership Facility aims at facilitating the development <strong>of</strong>radically new approaches to the carbon market that work atscales much larger than site-specific projects.From the beginning, there was concern about whether the<strong>Bank</strong>’s carbon funds would spur private sector participationor crowd it out—especially given the <strong>Bank</strong>’s perceived clout.UNFCCC statistics show that, using registered projects ortons as a measure, the <strong>Bank</strong>’s market share rapidly dwindled(figure 5.2). <strong>The</strong>re was a surge <strong>of</strong> project registrationswhen the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005, so that by2005 the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> comprised only a small share <strong>of</strong> themarket. That being so, one could question the relevance <strong>of</strong>the 2005 goal <strong>of</strong> helping countries to market carbon credits,as a vibrant market was already emerging at the time.<strong>The</strong> <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>’s market share <strong>of</strong> CDMprojects dwindled rapidly over time as avibrant market emerged.One way to assess the CFU’s demonstration effect on additionalityis to compare its relative success in securing CDMregistration. Registration is a measure <strong>of</strong> a project’s quality,including its stringency in determining additionality. <strong>The</strong>CFU’s ratio <strong>of</strong> problematic to registered projects is smallerthan that <strong>of</strong> the CDM at large (table 5.2).Figure 5.2<strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Share <strong>of</strong> CDM Projectsand Tons RegisteredPanel A. Registered projects (log scale)Registered CDM, number1,0001001012004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Registration, yearPanel B: CERs registeredCER by 2020 (tCO 2 ) (millions)1,2001,0008006004002000OtherWBG2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Registration, yearOtherWBGSource: Calculated by IEG based on IGES Oct 2009, IGES as <strong>of</strong>October 2009.Note: CDM = Clean <strong>Development</strong> Mechanism; CER = certifiedemission reduction.Special Topics | 75
- Page 1 and 2:
Phase II: The Challenge of Low-Carb
- Page 3 and 4:
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE WORLD BANK G
- Page 5 and 6:
Table of ContentsAbbreviations . .
- Page 7 and 8:
Figures1.1 GHG Emissions by Sector
- Page 9 and 10:
AcknowledgmentsThe report was prepa
- Page 11 and 12:
Executive SummaryUnabated, climate
- Page 13 and 14:
esettlement plans has been ineffect
- Page 15 and 16:
of some technologies, such as landf
- Page 17 and 18:
Scale up high-impact investmentsEne
- Page 19 and 20:
should have been strengthened in th
- Page 21 and 22:
Major monitorable IEGrecommendation
- Page 23 and 24:
Major monitorable IEGrecommendation
- Page 25 and 26:
Chairman’s Summary: Committee onD
- Page 27 and 28:
most places. Before we get there, w
- Page 29 and 30:
non-Annex I countries. The World Ba
- Page 31 and 32:
attention. In a couple of decades,
- Page 33 and 34:
GlossaryAdditionalityBankabilityBas
- Page 35 and 36:
Joint ImplementationA mechanism und
- Page 37 and 38:
Chapter 1evALuAtiOn HiGHLiGHts• T
- Page 39 and 40:
of interventions, from technical as
- Page 41 and 42:
would allow industrialized countrie
- Page 43 and 44:
growth, poverty reduction (includin
- Page 45 and 46:
Table 1.1 Map of the EvaluationSect
- Page 47 and 48:
Chapter 2eValuaTION HIGHlIGHTS• W
- Page 49 and 50:
Table 2.2Evaluated World Bank Renew
- Page 51 and 52:
Figure 2.2Breakdown of 2003-08 Low-
- Page 53 and 54:
Table 2.4 Commitments to Grid-Conne
- Page 55 and 56:
Box 2.1The Economics of Grid-Connec
- Page 57 and 58:
on average (Iyadomi 2010). (Reducti
- Page 59 and 60: and industrial policy. An increasin
- Page 61 and 62: Table 2.6Hydropower Investments by
- Page 63 and 64: costs for remaining unelectrified a
- Page 65 and 66: World Bank experienceTwo factors ac
- Page 67: Box 2.5On-Grid and Off-Grid Renewab
- Page 70 and 71: Energy EfficiencyThe first phase in
- Page 72 and 73: Box 3.1ESCOs and Energy Performance
- Page 74 and 75: have had limited causal impact on t
- Page 76 and 77: measurement of achieved economic re
- Page 78 and 79: Since the early 1990s, public entit
- Page 80 and 81: part with a $198 million IDA credit
- Page 83 and 84: Chapter 4eVAluATioN HigHligHTS• B
- Page 85 and 86: The WBG urban transport portfolio (
- Page 87 and 88: y conventional transport systems, i
- Page 89 and 90: include the forest carbon projects
- Page 91 and 92: for Costa Rica for the period 2000-
- Page 93 and 94: After 20 years of effort, systemati
- Page 95 and 96: orrowers have demonstrated the abil
- Page 97 and 98: Chapter 5EVALuATioN HigHLigHTS• O
- Page 99 and 100: Consequently, the efficiency with w
- Page 101 and 102: technologies could accelerate diffu
- Page 103 and 104: A second issue, inherent to any adv
- Page 105 and 106: goal of promoting wind turbine impr
- Page 107 and 108: ConclusionsThe WBG’s efforts to p
- Page 109: Table 5.1Carbon Funds at the World
- Page 113 and 114: Impacts on technology transferThe 2
- Page 115 and 116: Chapter 6Photo by Martin Wright/Ash
- Page 117 and 118: Figure 6.1800Economic and Carbon Re
- Page 119 and 120: Specifically, the WBG could:• Pla
- Page 121 and 122: Table 6.1Summary of Sectoral Findin
- Page 123 and 124: Table 6.1Sector Intervention Direct
- Page 125 and 126: Appendix ARenewable Energy Tables a
- Page 127 and 128: Table A.4Grid-Based Biomass/Biogass
- Page 129 and 130: Table A.5 (continued)Negative examp
- Page 131 and 132: Figure A.4A. Hydro/biomass capacity
- Page 133 and 134: Appendix bWorld Bank Experience wit
- Page 135 and 136: Table C.2Completed Low-Carbon Energ
- Page 137 and 138: TAble C.4Reviewed energy efficiency
- Page 139 and 140: the new capacity. Transmission syst
- Page 141 and 142: Table E.2Climate obligationsCoal Pl
- Page 143 and 144: Table F.2GHG objectiveModeNumber of
- Page 145 and 146: IEG eliminated a few cases of doubl
- Page 147 and 148: Table H.1Project andlocationBioener
- Page 149 and 150: Appendix ICarbon and Economic Retur
- Page 151 and 152: Appendix JRecent WBG Developments i
- Page 153 and 154: y providing value to standing fores
- Page 155 and 156: never had an explicit corporate str
- Page 157 and 158: overnight. The Bank can provide ass
- Page 159 and 160: Chapter 51. From the chief economis
- Page 161 and 162:
Hartshorn, G., P. Ferraro, and B. S
- Page 163 and 164:
______. 2007. World Development Ind
- Page 165 and 166:
IEG PublicationsAnalyzing the Effec