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360Pacific Worlddegree of interpretation), the distinction still seems justified since interpretationvaries by degree, from relatively weak to explicit and strong.6. Linda E. Olds, Metaphors of Interrelatedness: Toward a Systems Theoryof Psychology (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp.87–8; Jeffrey Goldstein, “Unbalancing Psychoanalytic Theory: MovingBeyond the Equilibrium Model of Freud’s Thought,” in Chaos Theory inPsychology and the Life Sciences, eds. Robin Robertson and Allan Combs(Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995), p. 242ff; Ludwig vonBertalanffy, “General System Theory and Psychology,” in Toward Unificationin Psychology, ed. J.R. Royce (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1970), p. 222; Günter Schiepek and Wolfgang Tschacher, “Applications ofSynergetics to Clinical Psychology,” in Self-Organization and ClinicalPsychology: Empirical Approaches to Synergetics in Psychology, eds. W.Tschacher, G. Schiepek, and E.J. Brunner (Berlin; New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), p. 4.7. James G. Miller, Living Systems (Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado,1995), p. 457.8. Goldstein, p. 245; Goldstein considers this a symptom of “physics envy”by early psychologists (Goldstein, p. 243). See also Roy Ginker, ed., Towarda Unified Theory of Human Behavior: An Introduction to General SystemsTheory (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. vii.9. Goldstein, p. 240.10. In the field of cognitive science, for example, strong arguments are nowbeing made in favor of dynamical rather than computational models ofcognition. See, for example, Tim van Gelder, “What Might Cognition Be, IfNot Computation?” Journal of Philosophy 91/7 (1995): pp. 345–81; Timothyvan Gelder and Robert F. Port, “It’s About Time: An Overview of theDynamical Approach to Cognition,” in Mind as Motion: Explorations inthe Dynamics of Cognition, eds. Robert F. Port and Timothy van Gelder(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 1–44.11. One of the most cited and forceful critiques of the essentialist orperennialist approach to mysticism is Steven Katz’s “Language, Epistemology,and Mysticism,” in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed.Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 22–74. Seealso Katz’s “Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning,” in Mysticism andLanguage, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),pp. 3–41; “The ‘Conservative’ Character of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticismand Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1983), pp. 3–60. Other persuasive critiques of essentialismor perennialism are Hans H. Penner’s “The Mystical Illusion,” inMysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1983), pp. 89–116 and Robert M. Gimello’s two essays,