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Transcript of Hearing 12/12/97 - TWA Flight 800 Investigation

Transcript of Hearing 12/12/97 - TWA Flight 800 Investigation

Transcript of Hearing 12/12/97 - TWA Flight 800 Investigation

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1unstable foam wandering around the fuel system.<strong>12</strong>53These2are all considerations.They are not insurmountable,34but they are all considerations that we have to focuson.5Secondly,one <strong>of</strong> the interesting aspects <strong>of</strong>67891011<strong>12</strong>131415161718some active inerting systems is that it moves theresponsibility for maintaining a safe fuel tank intothe cockpit to one degree or another, and that’s fine.We have a number <strong>of</strong> other systems we are responsiblefor.We are not necessarily objecting to having anadditional one, but if we go that particular route, ifthat is the option that is chosen, the system needs toexhibit a safe and reliable man–machine interface. Wedon’t want to have a system that comes into the cockpitthat introduces a couple more problems that openthemselves up to human error, et cetera, et cetera.Finally, I think, you know, the thing that is19also important ––and for this reason we had more or20less independently arrived at the conclusion that JP-52<strong>12</strong>2was a very interesting alternative.this to all fuel tanks.We need to apply23The center fuel tank is the focus <strong>of</strong>24attention for obvious reasons,but if we go back to the25Madrid accident we see the affects <strong>of</strong> an outboard wingCAPITAL HILL REPORTING, INC.(202) 466-9500

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