technique, weapon, tactic, or strategy that will minimizecasualties among our combat personnel is right, and anytechnique, tactic, or strategy that preserves the combateffectiveness of our opponent is wrong." [14]But in March 1970, even WHO consultants noted that allbiological agents permit the danger that if a disease capable ofspreading widely is produced, it may get out of control andbecome "a source of disaster to the attacker as well as theattacked.""The viral infections suitable for use in warfare include yellowfever, tick-borne encephalitis, Japanese encephalitis, dengue,Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), chikungunya, O'nyongnyong,Rift Valley fever, influenza, and small-pox. Tick-borneencephalitis may be taken as an example of the agents belongingto this group. Susceptibility is almost universal, and the ease withwhich the Far Eastern virus can be grown in the laboratory andits high infectivity and lethality by the aerosol route make itlikely that a case fatality rate of 25% would be achieved. . . .""The attacking country could, of course, attempt to protect itself,e.g., by immunization, but. . . more virulent forms of theorganism concerned might develop or the massive doses usedmight be such that ordinary levels of immunity would be useless.Thus it is possible that biological agents may be usedtactically, rather than strategically, to achieve thesimultaneous infection of key groups of people, and themilitary consequences might well be of major importance. . . .A decision to develop chemical and biological weap-ons impliesthat they will ultimately be used." [emphasis added]The consultants even predicted "a virulent mutant" that could"spread rapidly to produce an uncontrollable epidemic on a largescale." In addition, they warned, if mutants were deliberatelyproduced, there was the "ever-present risk of an accidentalescape." [15]Psychosocial ConsequencesWHO consultants additionally predicted grave psychosocialconsequences of such an escape, including mass hysteria:"They thus present a real danger that is conducive to both anxietyand fear. Anxiety in particular may result from the fact that manychemical and all biological agents are undetectable by the senses,so that there are no warning signs to enable people to defendthemselves. In addition, with biological agents, there is the latentperiod between infection and illness and the fact that the extent towhich an infection may spread through a community is
unpredictable. As a result, an exposed person cannot be surewhether he has been infected or know how ill he will be or whenthe danger has passed. A further confusing factor is that many ofthe symptoms of illness are also symptoms of emotional stress."[15]That sounded remarkably similar to the "fear of AIDS epidemic"I had frequently written and talked about. [l6-I8]In the event of an attack, the researchers added:"Panic. . . may be so great that. . . those who have not beenaffected will view those who have as potential agents of disease.The response to a chemical or biological attack may requireprecautionary or other measures on such a scale thatextraordinary means of social control will have to be introducedand these may remain in force long after the need for them haspassed. Thus, an attack may lead to social changes out of allproportion to the actual damage done."Isn't that interesting, I thought. They even predicted socialchanges like the need to legislate AIDS as a disability rather thana disease, and requiring infection control measures that have yetto prove their value in saving costs or lives.WHO consultants further predicted that the masses would try toavoid anything that would bring them in contact with deadlygerms. Much of this avoidance was expected to bedisproportionate to the actual risk.In my role as a health professional AIDS educator, I recalledseveral similar experiences. One had occurred a few weeksearlier following a television interview in Rockford, Illinois. Aviewer called me at the station to express her concern aboutleaving her house. The last time she went shopping, she said astorekeeper handed her a box of laundry detergent. She noticed afew cuts on his hands and refused to touch him or the box. Shejust panicked, left the store, and hadn't gone shopping since."Even though casual contact can't transmit HIV," I said to thestation receptionist, "people are still afraid-especially of shakinghands with AIDS patients or HIV carriers." Exactly what waspredicted, I reflected.Besides this, the consultants even envisioned extensive healthand medical emergencies as a consequence of a biological attack,"including mass illnesses, deaths, and epidemics." They expectedthat "WHO might be called upon to furnish technical assistancein dealing with allegations that chemical or biological weaponshad been used. . . and in achieving disarmament." [15]The authors concluded:"As long as research on the military use of chemical andbiological agents is continued. . . new agents of even greaterdestructive power [may be discovered]. . . . It is clear, therefore,that the best interests of all Member States, to say nothing of
- Page 2 and 3: EMERGING VIRUSES: AIDS &EBOLANature
- Page 4 and 5: inherent in the production of live
- Page 6 and 7: natural barrier and has been shown
- Page 8 and 9: "DAVID was an alcoholic, an active
- Page 10 and 11: mass of circumstantial and scientif
- Page 12 and 13: investigators, for a grossly uninfo
- Page 14 and 15: NIAID-National Institute for Allerg
- Page 16 and 17: Part IIntroduction and Scientific B
- Page 18 and 19: viruses in the cow carcasses used t
- Page 20 and 21: depend to maintain our relative fre
- Page 22 and 23: ʺThe WHO Does What?ʺ"The only thi
- Page 24 and 25: the buildup of new susceptibles in
- Page 26 and 27: In 1964, shortly after President Ke
- Page 28 and 29: lymphotrophic (lymph-cell-targeting
- Page 30 and 31: immunological and therapeutic proce
- Page 32 and 33: substances used in the diagnosis of
- Page 34 and 35: Chronicle 1969;23;3:112-117.[20] Si
- Page 36 and 37: In February 1967, as international
- Page 38 and 39: experiments conducted at Porton, En
- Page 42 and 43: mankind in general, require that th
- Page 44 and 45: experimental studies is to be comme
- Page 46 and 47: the virus genome, the genetic makeu
- Page 48 and 49: [17] Horowitz LG and Kehoe L. Fear
- Page 50 and 51: Chapter 4The Road to Fort Detrick R
- Page 52 and 53: information, I decided to call the
- Page 54 and 55: contamination) to help with manufac
- Page 56 and 57: nation. There is but one logical co
- Page 58 and 59: each part in terms of objectives -
- Page 60 and 61: weapons, and all other methods of b
- Page 62 and 63: two checks totaling $33,655.68 to t
- Page 64 and 65: Not surprisingly then, among the pr
- Page 66 and 67: and biological warfare. Indianapoli
- Page 68 and 69: Chapter 5The Emperorʹs New Virus"Y
- Page 70 and 71: At that time, retroviruses were see
- Page 72 and 73: it up to here with this goddamn dis
- Page 74 and 75: Collusion at the TopJim Goedert was
- Page 76 and 77: HTLV-III publication in Francis's p
- Page 78 and 79: the footprints of a retrovirus allo
- Page 80 and 81: questions. Had Gallo been ashamed o
- Page 82 and 83: Chapter 6Galloʹs Research Antholog
- Page 84 and 85: - - - - -Fig 6.2 - A Model of the N
- Page 86 and 87: That same year, Gallo and his cowor
- Page 88 and 89: team discussed the synthesis of new
- Page 90 and 91:
STRINGNER S. YANGROBERT C. TINGBion
- Page 92 and 93:
and pellets seperated. The pellets
- Page 94 and 95:
[5] Gallo RC and Breitman TR. The e
- Page 96 and 97:
Chapter 7An Interview with Dr. Robe
- Page 98 and 99:
human viruses, and that the genetic
- Page 100 and 101:
LEN: Now, who was studying that?ROB
- Page 102 and 103:
father's recommendation that I coul
- Page 104 and 105:
LEN: OK. Explain this now. Why did
- Page 106 and 107:
the cancer virus. . . . Nixon was t
- Page 108 and 109:
LEN: OK.ROBERT: And. . . that's the
- Page 110 and 111:
ROBERT: If you look in the world, w
- Page 112 and 113:
ROBERT: They're in the references [
- Page 114 and 115:
started with BVV.ROBERT: Well, in t
- Page 116 and 117:
LEN: OK. So what happens then?ROBER
- Page 118 and 119:
apology Gorbachev offered Reagan ac
- Page 120 and 121:
slowly, and not fast. And that they
- Page 122 and 123:
immunodeficiency virus. Nature 1987
- Page 124 and 125:
GalloRC. Aminoacyl Transfer RNA Pro
- Page 126 and 127:
history, organization, and program