CONSCIOUSNESS

2. Neuroscience 117
is 3 times larger than any previous brain network, and contains sub-networks corresponding to
classical corticocortical, corticosubcortical, and subcortico-subcortical white matter fiber systems.
The degree distribution of the network is consistent with an exponential distribution. We
discover two remarkable bridges between brain’s structure and function via network-theoretic
analysis. First, prefrontal cortex contains a lion’s share of topologically central regions. Second,
there exists a tightly integrated core circuit, spanning premotor cortex, prefrontal cortex,
temporal lobe, parietal lobe, thalamus, basal ganglia, cingulate cortex, insula, and visual cortex,
that contains both the task-positive and task-negative networks and may be the substrate
for higher cognition and consciousness. PL4
150 The Frames of Consciousness: The Role of Motivation and Emotion
Jordan Peterson, Jacob Hirsh (Psychology, University of
Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)
Classic theories of action in the world are predicated on the assumption that objects exist,
in some simple manner, and present themselves in that manner directly to perception.
These objects are then evaluated, cognitively and emotionally, and action calculated, as a
consequence of such evaluation. The emergence of the frame problem, a consequence of the
extreme but previously unrealized complexity of the world, poses a fatal threat to those classic
theories, as does the problem of combinatorial explosion, which manifests itself as the
apparent impossibility of calculating the consequences of actions over extended timeframes.
The world has to be simplified radically before it can be perceived, or before actions can be
successfully implemented. Some of this simplification exists as a consequence of external
structure. The artifacts of human culture protect individuals from much of the complexity of
the world. Social being performs a similar role, as specialized and cooperative individuals can
solve different sub-elements of the frame problem independently. Embodiment also plays a
role. The manner in which the human body is constructed enables certain kinds of perceptions
and actions, and makes others difficult, if not impossible. The psychological consequences of
embodiment also play an important limiting and enabling role. Human individuals confront
the world with an array of fundamental motivations, many of which are a direct consequence
of hypothalamic function. The hypothalamus frames perception, projects to motor systems,
and modulates autonomic responses, governing hunger, thirst, sexual responsivity, aggression,
and exploration, among other primordial motivations and values. The emotional systems
of the brain, governing approach and withdrawal, operate within those frames, in an
essentially cybernetic manner, informing the organism directed by hypothalamic prompting
whether perception, cognition, and goal-directed action is resulting in the consequences that
are currently desired. Higher order cortical centers regulate the interaction between different
hypothalamic value systems, organizing those intrapsychically and socially, so that each
fundamental necessity can be successfully achieved, in the social world. Thus, the archaic and
deeply physiological brain centers that human beings share with other animals, far down the
evolutionary hierarchy, unconsciously structure our conscious phenomenological worlds. P8
151 Finding the Function of Default States Adrienne Prettyman, Stephen Biggs
(Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada)
Brain scans show that subjects who lay awake and still without being given a task enter a
particular type of brain state, which is commonly called the ‘default state’. Evidence suggests
that the default state includes a structured network of brain regions that are, perhaps surprisingly,
more active in the absence than in the presence of a task. Raichle et al. (2001; 2009)
suggest that default states are particularly important to neuroscience because in the default
state the brain is ‘active but not activated’, and thus, the default state can be used as a neurological
baseline. Morcom et al. (2007) counter that since little is known about the cognitive
function of the default state, these claims are premature. Adjudicating this dispute has proven
to be difficult: since default activity occurs in the absence of a task, one cannot investigate
the default state by presenting subjects with a task, but presenting subjects with tasks and
observing their subsequent brain activity is the standard method for assessing the function of
brain networks. So, given standard methods in cognitive neuroscience, we have reached an