CONSCIOUSNESS

54 1. Philosophy
state, a new way to represent the old fact. It seems plausible to explain the intuition away in
the case of color experience. Nevertheless, in other cases, such as pain or other bodily sensation,
the representational accounts seem to face some obstacles. Thus, we can imagine another
situation that Mary is kept avoiding from having any bodily sensation, and at the same time,
she learns all physical knowledge about neural mechanism of bodily sensation. When one day
she first has the pain stimuli, will she recognize this experience as pain, or itch? P7
29 From Chaos to Qualia: An Analysis of Phenomenal Character in Light of Process
Philosophy and Self-Organizing Systems Gaylen Moore
(Philosophy, Kent State University, Ravenna, OH)
Recent advances in our understanding of complex dynamical systems may be of interest to
philosophers seeking the best metaphysical grounds for understanding the qualitative character
of subjective experience (qualia). I propose that qualia are not specifically brain processes,
but are instead best thought of as world processes that can be characterized as distributed
self-organizing networks of Whiteheadian actual entities. Whiteheadian actual entities have
intrinsic natures that ground the subjective/qualitative aspects of phenomena, but they also
exhibit extrinsic relations capable of grounding the physical properties studied by science.
This suggests that qualia - normally associated with the purely mental - may be better understood
as the metaphysical ground of both mental and physical properties. Due to its peculiar
blending of internal and external relations, this Whiteheadian model implies that different
aspects of a quale that a subject experiences as a specific shade of blue, might be contributed
by contemporaneous entities that are also contributing other aspects of other qualia to other
subjects widely distributed throughout time and space. Cellular automata and network models
may be used to help clarify some aspects of this proposal. P1
1.5 Machine consciousness
30 Minds, Machines, and Lucas-Penrose Thomas Benda
(Instit.of Philosophy of Mind, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan)
The famous Lucas-Penrose argument is directed against mechanism, the thesis that the
mind can be modeled by a computer. Its newest version (Penrose 1994) derives a contradiction
from the assumption that human (arithmetic) knowledge is constituted by a set of propositions
which is which is the output of a computing machine. It contains a step S in which it
is established that the set of theorems derivable from that assumption is consistent. For S to
work, however, a truth or knowability predicate K is required whose application to some Goedelian
fixed point reveals that the set of knowable propositions is not definable, preventing
S from going through (Chalmers 1995; Shapiro 2003). No mechanical way has been found
to restrict K to prevent its problematic application. Hence it seems that the Lucas-Penrose
argument uses tools beyond mechanistic powers to show that human knowledge exceeds
what a machine can derive. Similar reasoning, however, can be used to weaken the case of
the mechanist. To model propositional human belief, take a fairly weakly designed doxastic
logic, which is a conservative extension of Zermelo’s set theory, with expression variables
x,. a binary predicate constant B and a quotation symbol ‘ ‘. The elementary formula B’x’k
is read as “’x’ is believed with background k”. The second place k plays the role of a belief
context. Axioms are, besides statements about form and minimum consistency of beliefs: (B3)
“For every background and every held belief, the denial of its being held is not believed.”
(B4) “For every background, believing that all x are A implies that for every x it is believed
that x is A.” An additional inference rule is (RB) “From A infer belief of A with some background.”
(RB) is, due to the existential quantifier, weak. Indeed, for any state of affairs A, a
background of interest or expertise can be conjured, such that A is believed. This logic looks
barely strong enough to cover beliefs we have, yet from (B3), (B4) and (RB) inconsistency
is readily derived, so the set of beliefs under it is not definable (Benda 2009). Again, no mechanical
means seem to be available to prevent an application of a belief predicate that brings
about inconsistency. So the set of beliefs under this logic is not definable. On the other hand,
there are good reasons to maintain that the physical states of a brain or, for that matter, of