CONSCIOUSNESS

3. Cognitive Sciences and Psychology 129
participants stated that they no longer worried about the problem. Comments. This procedure
is effective and offers a possibility to facilitate nonconscious thought processes in a research
setting. Real life concerns can be studied as well as constructed tasks. Assessing the intensity
of a problem and its resolution by measuring its emotional impact appears to be practical. Participant
interviews and self reports may provide information about the dynamics that underlie
these cognitive conscious and nonconscious processes. P3
173 James in the 21st Century Bruce Mangan (Institute
of Cognitive and Brain Studies, Oakland, CA)
William James stays forever new, but his phenomenological analysis of the “fringe” of
consciousness, especially the feeling I will call “rightness”, has been relatively neglected.
Now various strands of experimental research – from metacognition and tacit learning to
the study of intuition – have confirmed the thrust of James’ account, linking a wide range of
empirical findings with the most powerful, scientifically grounded phenomenology in our
language. This offers a new way to integrate and extend consciousness research, and opens up
what might be called a bio-engineering investigation of the mechanisms of conscious/nonconscious
interaction. We can begin to explain the character and structure of our phenomenology
via its function, just as we explain other aspects of our biology. This new kind of functional
analysis is not hostage to functionalism in its current sense nor to the disembodied presumptions
of AI. Fringe experiences are diaphanous, have no evident sensory content, and elude the
“grasp” of focal attention. Yet on James’ analysis they are at the heart of conscious cognition,
constituting among other things feelings of meaningfulness, expectation and evaluation. The
evaluative aspect is paramount: “the most important feeling in these fringes ... is the feeling
of harmony or discord, of a right or wrong direction in the thought.” (Psychology: The Briefer
Course, 183.) James did not develop this point, but it throws light on some of our most puzzling
and rewarding experiences: the intense feeling of rightness that apparently constitutes
the “Aha!” of great insight, the zap of great art, the sense of universal coherence and ineffable
disclosure of mystical experience. Functional analysis links James’ phenomenology to
two basic findings of the cognitive revolution: while the relative capacity of consciousness is
miniscule, consciousness is supported by vast amounts of parallel, non-conscious processing.
We argue that the fringe finesses the limited capacity of consciousness by radically condensing
context information. Rightness signals the degree of integration: the more tightly our
conscious/nonconscious cognitive system is integrated, the stronger the experience of rightness.
PL1
174 Why Did the Unconsciousness Appear in History When It Did? A Jaynesian
Explanation Brian McVeigh (East Asian Studies,
University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ)
The unconscious has arguably manifested its ghostly presence in the corners of the edifice
of Western thought since the time of the classical Greeks. Nevertheless, it has not received
sustained attention throughout the centuries. We must ask why, then, the idea of ‘unconscious
mental processes’ was conceivable around 1700, topical around 1800, and widespread by
around 1900 (Whyte, 1978). In order to explain why the unconscious emerged as a topical
issue in the nineteenth century, I employ the theories of Julian Jaynes. Specifically, I
propose three interlinked points. First, the real mystery is not the unconscious, but rather
consciousness itself, since it often appears unnecessary for human activity. Therefore, in order
to understand unconscious processes, we must first appreciate the nature of conscious
interiorization. After all, if people throughout history did not explicitly theorize about what is
introspectable (consciousness), then there was little need to consider what was not introspectable
(unconsciousness). This brings us to the second point: how can conscious interiorization
be described? This can be done by breaking it down into its constituent features: (1) metaphoric
spatialization of psyche; (2) introception (i.e., interiorized perception); (3) excerption;
(4) self-narratization; (5) self-autonomy; (6) self-authorization; (7) conciliation; (8) individuation;
(9) self-reflexivity. This brings us to the final point: what exactly is the purpose of
conscious interiorization? Answer: it is a cultural adaptation that has increased in intensity in