CONSCIOUSNESS

3. Cognitive Sciences and Psychology 123
accounting for a larger set of phenomena, into a broader concept such as Episodic Processing
(EP). EP would be in that sense defined as involving event-like constructive, rather than
past-oriented mnemonic, information. Thus, AC might be a general feature of EP, rather than a
distinguishing quality of EM. That view coheres with the Episodic Buffer (EB) hypothesis of
a working memory module processing dynamic, event-like representations. Representations
in the EB constructed online from perceptual, short- and long-term information available to
working memory. In line with these results, the EB would be the candidate cognitive module
responsible for episodic processing, regardless of the pastness of the occurence to which it
refers. P9
163 Analysis of the Spatial-Temporal Organization of Episodic Memory Based on
Irreducible Field Principle Michael Lipkind (Unit of Molecular
Virology, De, Kimron Veterinary Institute, Beit Dagan, Israel)
Spatial-temporal arrangement of molecular traces of currently memorized events within
the brain intracellular continuum is unexplainable in the frame of the existing paradigm. As to
the spatial arrangement, its paradox is elicited by the discrepancy between an infinite amount
of potential unlimitedly different memorized events to be accumulated within the brain up
to any particular moment of an individual’s life-time, on one hand, and a limited (although
tremendously high) potential amount of the respective inter-neuronal connections which are
considered as neural correlates of memorization, on the other hand. As to the temporal arrangement
of the molecular traces of the memorized events, it looks totally enigmatic, since
any conception of a “time axis” is unimaginable as realized (“functioning”) within the intracellular
molecular substrate of living neurons, in spite of a common persuasion that in reality
a normal human being during recollection initially realizes which of the memorized events occurred
earlier and which occurred later. An alternative possibility is that the apprehended temporal
succession of the memorized events results from their immediate mental confrontation
and systematization, but not as a result of the existence of a genuine temporal arrangement of
the memorized events, which, hence, is an illusion. The suggested approach to the problem is
based on the notion of the autonomous field grounded on the theory of biological field by A.
Gurwitsch. Accordingly, the formulated field concept is irreducible to the established physical
fundamentals while strictly defined by the postulates deeply rooted in biological reality. The
dynamic field concept including the time notion as an intrinsic parameter of the formulation is
employed as a competent correlate of the current temporal memorization. An infinite number
of potential field states cover any possible amount of any memorized events and facts. Memorization
of a particular event is correlated with the respective change of the field ‘configuration’
as a dynamic state determined by the field parameters - values including the temporal
parameter. The suggested theory describes both the episodic memory (biographical events)
and semantic memory (individual’s store of knowledge), which are represented by the respective
molecular ‘traces’ (vestiges) of the current stream of the afferent to be perceived stimuli
projected upon the brain’s field-determined intracellular molecular continuum. M. Lipkind,
Unit of Molecular Virology, Kimron Veterinary Institute, Bet Dagan, POB 12, 50258 Israel;
International Institute of Biophysics, Neuss-Hombroich, D-41472 Germany P3
3.5 Emotion
164 What’s in a Feeling? An Argument for the Intentionality of Affect Scott Clifton
(Philosophy, University of Washington, Port Orchard, WA)
One supposed problem for purely affective accounts of emotion is that there is always
the possibility that the physiological complex – what is called the feeling – associated with
one situation be qualitatively identical to the feeling associated with another, even when the
emotion experienced in the first situation differs in kind from the emotion experienced in the
second. This is what I call the individuation problem. It’s often argued that any account of
emotion needs to incorporate intentional content, in order to guard against cases where the
feelings are the same, but the emotion-types are different. Mental states are often thought then