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CONSCIOUSNESS

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3. Cognitive Sciences and Psychology 121<br />

159 The Semantics of ‘Perception’: A Critical Examination of D. Milner and M.<br />

Goodale’s Proposal Simone Marini (School of Philosophy,<br />

Ph.D. student at University College Dublin - Schoo, Dublin, Ireland)<br />

In this paper, I focus on D. Milner and M. Goodale’s notion of “perception” and argue:<br />

(1) that either it is not such a radical departure from the preceding tradition of visual studies<br />

(championed by L. Urgerleider and M. Mishkin) as they suppose, or it involves semantic<br />

confusion; (2) that their sharp dorsal/ventral dichotomy is not well supported by empirical<br />

findings. Milner and Goodale argue that there are two different uses of the word “perception”:<br />

an ordinary one, which refers generically to any inputs conveyed through the senses and “is<br />

quite common in both visual science and in everyday language” (Milner & Goodale, 2006: 2),<br />

and a more restricted and philosophical one, “to refer to a process which allows one to assign<br />

meaning and significance to external objects and events.” (Ibidem) They use “perception”<br />

in the latter sense, which basically equates perception with “visual awareness” of external<br />

stimuli, their cognitive identifications through abstract representational percepts, and their<br />

storage in long-term memory. My worry is that Milner and Goodale’s clear-cut distinction<br />

between dorsal/action/automatic and ventral/perception/representational may be too simplistic<br />

and have no correspondence in the actual organization of visual processings. For instance,<br />

fMRIs performed during visual detection tasks seem to show neural activation in both dorsal<br />

and ventral areas (Beck et al., 2001). Furthermore, it seems that Milner and Goodale’s narrow,<br />

‘philosophical’, use of the term “perception” already presupposes a rigid and discrete dualism<br />

between action and perception at the level of their cortical substrates. They advanced this hypothesis<br />

on the assumption that perception does not have an independent evolutionary value<br />

and its ultimate scope is to facilitate action, via abstract representations of the goals we seek<br />

to pursue. Now, if this is a correct understanding of their proposal, how does it substantially<br />

differ from the “perceptual tradition” they are departing from? Milner and Goodale claim<br />

that for the previous tradition the ultimate goal of vision is perception, not action, but I fear<br />

there might be a semantic confusion here: in criticizing the “perceptual tradition”, Milner and<br />

Goodale are using the term “perception” in its restricted sense; on the other hand, that tradition<br />

uses the term in a broader general sense, as referring to the processings of any sensory<br />

inputs. Thus, in the end, the difference between the “perceptual” theories of visual processings<br />

and Milner and Goodale’s proposal might simply be that the first ones stress the importance<br />

of perception (in the broad sense), and the latter of action, in the overall visual processings<br />

of external stimuli to produce visuomotor outputs. Regardless, even if Milner and Goodale’s<br />

criticism were efficacious, wouldn’t it count against their own view? If the “perceptual nonphilosophical<br />

bias” adopted by the preceding visual scientific tradition prevented it from discerning<br />

a separate cortical visual pathway (the dorsal pathway) which automatically processes<br />

visual stimuli for action, couldn’t it be the case that Milner and Goodale are endorsing a different<br />

and opposite semantic “non-philosophical bias” (that vision’s primary goal is action)<br />

which misleads their interpretation of the experimental data available? P9<br />

3.3 Other sensory modalities<br />

160 The Harmonics of Hades Kristopher Patten, Michael McBeath<br />

(Psychology, ASU - Pearl Lab, Queen Creek, AZ)<br />

The ‘diabolus in musica’, or ‘Satan Chord’, is reputed to be the most unsettling combination<br />

of notes that can be played by a musical instrument. Spectral analyses of the Satan Chord,<br />

which also goes by the name of diminished fifth, reveal that the peak points of energy in<br />

megahertz are not evenly spaced, but instead appear almost haphazard in their placement. A<br />

variety of sounds from the natural world (animal calls, wind, running water, etc.) and musical<br />

instruments, along with some sounds that were synthesized from different pitches of sine<br />

tones were presented to participants. The participants were instructed to rate the sounds on<br />

a nine point scale, with one being horrendous and nine being angelic. Once the ratings were<br />

complete, each different sound was put through spectral analysis to determine the energy pattern.<br />

Preliminary results show that humans prefer sounds that have nearly equidistant energy<br />

patterns to both sounds that have no pattern to their energy signatures and sounds that have

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