CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Philosophy 83
of thought and language, it is clear that my conscious states are sufficient to make it the case
that I mean plus rather than quus by ‘+’. Kripke also gives us strong reasons to think that the
physical workings of my body and brain can’t determine that I mean plus rather than quus
by ‘+’. In the light of these considerations, I offer the following rule-following argument
against physicalism: (i) If Mary only knows that physical facts about me, then she won’t know
whether I mean plus of quus by ‘+’, (ii) Once she learns about my conscious states, Mary
knows that I mean plus rather than quus by ‘+’, (iii) Therefore, the facts about my conscious
states are not physical facts. C1
86 Phenomenal Externalism and Self-Knowledge Amir Horowitz
(History, Philosophy and Judaic, The Open University of Israel, Ra’anana, Israel)
Semantic externalism has been charged for not respecting the a poriori nature of self
knowledge. Specifically, it has been argued that it is a consequence of externalism that one
can distinguish a priori between the content of one’s beliefs and all other possible contents,
but that externalism entails that one cannot distinguish one’s water-beliefs (beliefs about H2O
samples) and one’s twater-beliefs (beliefs about XYZ samples). An extension of this charge
applies to phenomenal externalism. In this talk, a new way for defending semantic externalism
from that charges is suggested, and then it is applied to the respective charge against
phenomenal externalism. Central to the suggested solution is the “quotation principle”: that
if one has the belief one would express by “I believe that P”, one would normally have the
second-order belief one would express by “I believe that I believe that P”. It is argued that
the resolution of our a priori knowledge of our beliefs is no greater than the resolution that is
embodied by the quotation principle, and that this is true also on the assumption that contents
are externally determined. Thus, the resolution of our second-order beliefs vis a vis our firstorder
beliefs on the assumption that their contents are externally determined is identical to
the resolution that it makes sense to attribute to our knowledge of our beliefs independently
of any assumption about content-determination, and semantic externalism can rebuff the attack
from self-knowledge. Phenomenal externalism comes in two varieties. The first simply
follows from the conjunction of semantic exeternalism and the representational theory of
phenomenality (or any theory according to which representational content plays a role in
the determination of phenomenal character). Phenomenal externalism of this variety faces a
challenge that is identical to the one that semantic externalism faces and can be treated in the
same way. Phenomenal externalism of the second, stronger, variety is the view that the object
of a perceptual state plays a constitutive role in the state’s phenomenal character, so one’s veridical
perception and one’s related hallucination necessarily differ in phenomenal character.
This variety of phenomenal externalism faces a challenge that is different, although related, to
the previous one, a challenge that concerns one’s ability to distinguish a priori between one’s
veridical perception and one’s related hallucination. It is shown how the suggested solution to
the challenge for semantic externalism can be applied to this challenge as well. P1
87 The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness and Anti-Individualism Bernard W. Kobes
(Philosophy, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ)
Tyler Burge, in Foundations of Mind (2007), argues that phenomenal consciousness is,
in a certain sense, reflexive: sensation x (of e.g. color, pain, or visual blur) is present in phenomenal
consciousness to subject S through x itself. For Burge this is one species of a generic
3-place relation: x is present to subject S through mode of presentation m. Phenomenal
consciousness involves a species of this generic relation in which the first and third relata are
identical. Burge restricts his discussion to cases in which reflexive modes of presentation are
individualistically individuated. I consider an extension of the theory in which intentional
contents may be rational-access conscious in virtue of externally individuated reflexive modes
of presentation. C1