CONSCIOUSNESS

44 1. Philosophy
counter Newman’s argument by claiming that structure is indeed all we need to interpret the
scientific worldview (French/Ladyman 2003). I will defend and extend Newman’s original
argument against various criticisms that have been advanced against it in recent years, and
place it in the context of Putnam’s famous ‘model theoretic argument.’ It will be shown that
modest forms of structural realism will have to assume the existence of some kind of intrinsic
properties. Thus the argument from intrinsic natures to panpsychism will still go through since
prima facie the best candidates for tout court intrinsic properties are phenomenal properties.
Only a radical form of structural realism, a relationalism which assumes only the existence of
relations and denies the existence of objects of any kind, might possibly be defended against
Newmann’s argument. But is this idea ultimately defensible? Going back to Leibniz thesis
that all relational properties must be based in intrinsic properties and by referring to some
recent arguments (Floridi 2008) against the theory of radical structural realism, it will be
claimed that the core argument for panpsychism from intrinsic natures is still standing. It
will then be argued that the best candidate we have for intrinsic properties are (proto-)mental
properties by analyzing some of the alternatives for absolutely intrinsic properties. Physical
properties like “mass” can either be analyzed in functional terms or - after careful analysis -
seem to imply a (proto-)mental aspect. C9
8 Does Panexperientialistic Holism Solve the Combination Problem? Alexander J.
Buck, Ludwig J. Jaskolla (Metaphysics, Munich School of
Philosophy; KSFH Muenchen, München, Germany)
The combination problem is still one of the sternest problems for panexperientialistic
ontology. Prominently, among others, Phil Goff argued in 2009 with two papers that panexperientialists
cannot get around the combination problem. Therefore, they need to argue for the
at first hand contra-intuitive notion of panexperientialism in combination with a strong interattribute
version of emergence bridging the gap between proto-experiential simples and the fullblown
consciousness of human persons. At the end of the day, it seems panexperientialism
rests on weak systematic grounds. We want to address Goff’s challenge from two different
angles: (1) We will argue that Goff’s attack is only relevant, if parsimoniousness is the only
methodological principle for evaluating and comparing ontologies. As soon as other principles,
for example questions of adequacy with everyday experience or coherence with the
framework human theories of reality, are deployed at the problem, we are forced to admit that
panexperientialism is the best option for explaining consciousness in naturalistic terms. (2)
Our second approach will sketch a version of panexperientialism for which the combination
problem does not arise at all. `Panexperiential Holism’, such as supposed by T.L.S. Sprigge
in 2006, is the theory that the universe as a whole is one big experiential matter of fact. What
we normally believe to be independent centers of conscious subjectivity are merely long-lived
structural features of this big experience. We argue that the combination problem does not
arise in this context. The ‘Lego’-Block orientated, naive thought of simple ‘combination’ is
misleading, misguided and must be abandoned. Nevertheless, there are some interesting (and
maybe frightening) consequences entailed by this approach. We will be coping with three of
these consequences: (2.1) The big universal experience needs to be self-referential. (2.2) The
notion of ‘personal identity’ is essentially vague and may lead us into something like Derek
Parfit’s ‘Relation R’ (1984).Therefore, persons are not merely series of experiences, but (in
an anti-realistic fashion) exemplifying the common denominator of these experiences. In this
sense, a person is what has experiences, or the subject of experiences. And (2.3) There is no
lower-limit to reality. Experience is the ontological cement of the World. Despite of these
consequences, quite welcoming some of them (e.g. the resulting personal identity concepts),
we argue that panexperientialistic holism is a promising candidate in the framework of naturalistic
theories of consciousness. C9
9 Abstract and Imaginary Sense Data Scott Jackson
(Prescott College, Tucson, AZ)
Direct realists claim the direct objects of perception are sense data. However, in contrast
to direct realist claims, the senses perceive abstract sense data. The adult and early child-