CONSCIOUSNESS

60 1. Philosophy
can eventually see beyond the core self-identity representations, and personal history directing
attention to reveal our true identity as awareness itself. In the expanded reflective capacity
of meditation or peak experience or advanced spiritual development we can experience ourselves
directly as the loving consciousness forming the structure all around us. P1
41 How EPI are Phenomena: Velmans, Robinson, Dennett and Others Bill Faw
(Psychology, Brewton-Parker College, Mount Vernon, GA)
The word Phenomenon comes from philosophical Greek referring to the appearing to one,
of sense data, mental images, or thoughts in the mind. Epi-phenomenon comes from more
whimsical Greek for surface, superficial appearances. To argue that ‘consciousness’ has causal
efficacy – does something to something – necessitates (a) defining what consciousness is and
(b) specifying what consciousness does. Psychologist Max Velmans maintains that conscious
experience creates a phenomenal world around us, and thus allows the universe to look in on
itself, and that conscious experience is responsible for the development of science, but denies
that conscious experience has causal efficacy, even in cognitive processing, citing Wegner, Libet,
and others. Velmans appears to hold what I label a form of empirical epiphenomenalism,
which I argue is contradicted by the bulk of modern consciousness science. Philosopher Bill
Robinson presents a form of philosophical epiphenomenalism, in which phenomenalism and
physicalism are given their due, but never the twain shall meet. For Robinson, the existence
of tasks – which can be done only through activation of brain processes that also cause conscious
events – is not an argument against ephenomenalism. Dan Dennett helps me articulate
my intuitive sense that Velmans and Robinson mean very different things by epiphenomenalism
– an empirical (psycyhological, physiological) epiphenomenalism versus a philosophical
epiphenomenalism. I make a case against empirical epiphenomenalism, while remaining
agnostic regarding philosophical epiphenomenalism – presumably the opposite moves that
Dennett makes!. C9
42 The Human Mind May be a Turing-Machine-Like System Even If the Lucas-
Penrose Argument is Right Jenyu Liu (National Yang-Ming
University, Taipei, Taiwan)
The conclusion of the Lucas-Penrose argument is that the operation of the human mind
cannot be the operation of a Turing machine. Many people conclude from this argument that
the human mind can not be a Turing machine. Though in the strict sense, if we accept the
conclusion of this argument, the human mind is not a Turing machine, it’s still possible that
the human mind is very similar to a Turing machine. There are possible ways that make the
human mind similar to a Turing machine. I will propose one possibility in this essay. The possibility:
We can conceive the human mind as a Turing machine at a given time, and the human
mind is a series of Turing machines, which change over time. This is coherent with the actual
situation, for our brains are changing all the time. If so, we cannot apply the Lucas-Penrose
argument on human minds. This is coherent with the actual situation, for our brains are changing
all the time and we are learning all the time. So, we may conclude from the Lucas-Penrose
argument that we are not a single fixed Turing machine, but we still can be a system of a series
of Turing machines that change over time. If so, the Lucas-Penrose argument seems not to do
many helps to convince us that human minds have more power than a computer. P1
1.7 The ‘hard problem’ and the explanatory gap
43 The Hard Problem and a Possible Solution Stephen Deiss
(San Diego, CA)
If accepted for a talk in Tucson, I will present a definition of consciousness that is intuitive
and usable. From that definition I will show how it helps to reset the “hard problem.” The
gist of the idea is that all our knowledge comes from how we interpret our sensations and
then store them as memories to guide our future action. From a simple idea much ensues. P7