CONSCIOUSNESS

74 1. Philosophy
are wrong simpliciter. But it would be better if the error theorist could modify their account to
show how certain color sentences can be true while still holding that the folk are wrong about
color. I’ll argue that Boghossian and Velleman’s projective error theory offers up no acceptable
way to understand what is going on in color talk, and propose my own theory. My main
objection is that they base their semantics on pragmatic value, eliminating reference to truth
in color sentences, but that there are sentences involving colors that are true. I’ll then offer
my own proposal. I’ll show that object representations are necessarily colored, but that colors
don’t track objects the same way object representations do. From this, it follows that colors
aren’t represented as intrinsic properties (though phenomenology presents them as intrinsic).
I’ll argue that this gives us motivation to adopt an adverbial theory of color representation:
objects are represented color-ly. This is deeply connected to Fregean strategies for perceptual
content, such as that advocated by David Chalmers and Brad Thompson. I’ll develop an adverbial
theory within the framework of the Fregean theory of perceptual content, and then I’ll
answer objections, one involving inverted spectra and the other involving the veridicality of
color representations. P7
69 Consciousness, Access and Phenomenal Overflow: A Reply to Block T. Bradley
Richards (Philosophy, University of Guelph, Toronto, Ontario
Canada)
Ned Block claims that phenomenology “overflows” cognitive accessibility, that the capacity
of phenomenal experience is greater than the capacity of the “global workspace”, and thus,
that there are conscious experiences that are inaccessible. He thinks overflow is the best explanation
of certain experimental results (especially from Sperling (1960) and Landman et.al.,
(2003).I have followed various critics, and Block himself, in insisting that phenomenal overflow
is only a good explanation of the experimental results if the subjects in these experiments
have specific (as opposed to generic) phenomenal contents of the relevant kind for all or most
of the items presented prior to the cue. Block must distinguish between two kinds of access in
order for his view to be intelligible, but he cannot use subjects’ reports as evidence of specific
phenomenology in the phenomenal overflow experiments: this would require subjects to both
have and not have *cognitive access* to a content C at t. This leaves Block with only neural
evidence, and at least current neural evidence does not support the claim that subjects have
specific phenomenology of the relevant kind. Given that there is no evidence that the subjects
have specific phenomenology, phenomenal overflow is not even a good explanation of the
experimental results. While these considerations do not show that there are no inaccessible
phenomenal states, they do show that we have no reason to posit them. Further, if there were
inaccessible phenomenal states, it would be impossible to specify phenomenal contents of
any kind. Thus, if phenomenal contents or the theories that employ them are of any value, we
have a reason not to posit inaccessible phenomenal contents. Finally, I speculate that Block’s
original claim that phenomenology overflows accessibility would be vindicated if there was
contentless phenomenal experience. This would account for our intuition that infants and certain
kinds of animals can be conscious despite lacking the capacity for certain kinds of higher
order thought, and broadcasting to the global workspace (and a global workspace). It would
also account for correlates of phenomenal consciousness that are not broadcast, if there are
any, without requiring inaccessible phenomenal contents. P7
70 Theory of Consciousness and the Self. What was in the Mind of Marx, Freud and
Einstein When They Conceived Their Respective Theories? Juan Tomas Rodriguez-
Colon (San Juan, PR)
The German philosopher, Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz, stated that in a logical and truthful
proposition the content or nature of the predicate (consciousness) must be derived from the
nature of the subject. The proposed theory defines what constitutes the individuality of any
person, explaining thus the nature of the predicate or behavior in terms of the subject as it was
conceived by Leibniz. According to us, the essence of that individuality is based on a new
conception regarding the proper group of names, their etymologies, and archetypes implicit in
the constitution and development of the conscious personality. The theory establishes the idea