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American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

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BLICESTER: That’s crazy.<br />

JUDGE: No, that’s estoppel. When you lie and then try to take<br />

advantage of it in a court, we judges will use our inherent equitable<br />

powers to prevent ourselves from helping you do it. We do that by<br />

making you shut up.<br />

BLICESTER: But the proof is right here!<br />

JUDGE [hammers gavel]: Shut up. Bailiff, see his lordship out.<br />

Next case!<br />

Equity Says You Can’t Have It Both Ways. This “equitable” power of judges<br />

makes a good deal of sense. It’s one thing <strong>for</strong> someone to cheat another. It’s something<br />

very different <strong>for</strong> courts to help someone use the law to cheat. Where one party has<br />

lied and tries to take advantage of that lie, he or she will be estopped to contradict<br />

the previous lie.<br />

Over time, however, the doctrine of estoppel—originally called “estoppel in<br />

pais” (roughly, “estoppel by your own conduct”), became broader. There began to be<br />

categories, such as estoppel by deed, estoppel by record, and estoppel by silence, but<br />

all of these ultimately came to be categorized, in <strong>American</strong> law, as “equitable<br />

estoppel.” Judges began to apply the principle to situations in which the speaker did<br />

not deliberately lie, but was merely negligent about the truth. Finally, the principle<br />

came to be applied even in situations where the facts turned out to be untrue even<br />

though the speaker was acting entirely in good faith. All of these <strong>for</strong>ms of equitable<br />

estoppel, however, applied only to statements of fact, not to promises.<br />

Reliance on What? People do, however, rely on many statements that are not<br />

facts, including opinions, predictions, and promises. When A makes a promise to B,<br />

B might well rely on that promise. If the promise is in the <strong>for</strong>m of a contract, reliance<br />

by the promisee is reasonable due to the promise being en<strong>for</strong>ceable at law. If the<br />

promise is made by someone you trust, reliance may be reasonable based on that trust<br />

relationship. But what if you rely on a promise from someone you hardly know, and<br />

it is not the kind of exchange transaction we saw in our consideration cases? Will the<br />

law en<strong>for</strong>ce a promise just because you relied on it?<br />

The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is yes—sometimes. Because the doctrine of<br />

equitable estoppel requires a false statement of fact, judges developed a new doctrine<br />

based on an unkept promise and called it “promissory estoppel.” Rather than basing<br />

the en<strong>for</strong>ceability of a promise on the presence of absence of consideration, promissory<br />

estoppel is grounded in the concept of reliance.<br />

Promissory Estoppel Is Something, But Not Everything. After suffering<br />

through the study of consideration and its technicalities, many law students become<br />

overly attached to promissory estoppel, viewing it as a solution <strong>for</strong> every injustice<br />

that occurs based on the absence of an otherwise en<strong>for</strong>ceable contract. The doctrine,<br />

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158 CHAPTER III: CONSIDERATION

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