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American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

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not delivered the millet to it, Denney purportedly remarked that it was “too bad”<br />

Scoular did not have a signed contract.<br />

Thereafter, Scoular instituted the present action <strong>for</strong> monetary damages, based<br />

on claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. 3 After a<br />

bench trial, the trial court determined that (1) Denney had entered into and breached<br />

an en<strong>for</strong>ceable contract to sell 15,000 bushels of millet to Scoular at $ 5 per hundred<br />

weight of product and (2) Scoular was entitled to recover $82,500 in damages arising<br />

from Denney’s breach. The court did not address Scoular’s alternative theories <strong>for</strong><br />

relief.<br />

On appeal, Denney contends that the trial court erred in concluding that he<br />

had entered into an en<strong>for</strong>ceable contract with Scoular to sell millet. Although a<br />

contract is <strong>for</strong>med when an offer is accepted, Williams v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 928 P.2d<br />

1375, 1379 (Colo. App. 1996), Denney asserts that (1) under UCC § 2-101, et seq.,<br />

Colorado’s version of the Uni<strong>for</strong>m Commercial Code (UCC), he could not be bound to<br />

a contract based only on his oral offer to sell; (2) contrary to the trial court’s<br />

conclusion, Scoular’s contracting to sell the millet to a third party did not constitute<br />

an acceptance of his offer; and (3) if a contract was entered into, it was not en<strong>for</strong>ceable<br />

because it was not in writing and signed by both parties.<br />

Denney contends that, under § 2-205, he could not be bound by what the trial<br />

court referred to as a “firm offer” because the offer had not been made in writing. We<br />

disagree.<br />

As Denney notes, the purpose of the section is “to modify the <strong>for</strong>mer rule which<br />

required that ‘firm offers’ be sustained by consideration in order to bind, and to<br />

require instead that they must merely be characterized as such and expressed in<br />

signed writings.” Section 2-205 cmt. 1. As the language of § 2-205 itself makes clear,<br />

as used in the comment, the term “bind” means only to make irrevocable.<br />

Indeed, as noted by one leading treatise, under common law “it was frequently<br />

said ‘an offeror can always withdraw an offer if no consideration was received <strong>for</strong> it.’”<br />

1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-4 (4TH ED.<br />

1995). “Section 2-205 is intended mainly to limit the power of an offeror to withdraw<br />

a firm offer when the offeree reasonably relies on the offer’s firmness.” Id. § 1-4.<br />

Thus viewed, the purpose of § 2-205 is only to establish a type of offer that,<br />

although not supported by consideration, is nonetheless irrevocable; § 2-205 is not<br />

intended to provide the exclusive mechanism by which a valid (though perhaps<br />

revocable) offer can be made. See 2 LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM<br />

3 [Notice that breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment are all<br />

alternative causes of action raised by the plaintiff. Scoular would not ultimately be able to recover<br />

under more than one of these claims. Breach of contract is unsurprisingly listed first because it would<br />

provide a financially more attractive recovery than the two more “equitable” causes of action. – Eds.]<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

UNIT 10: UCC SCOPE AND FORMATION 189

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