06.09.2021 Views

American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

covenant not to compete, he could have abandoned the relationship with impunity.<br />

Absent mutuality, there can be no contract to en<strong>for</strong>ce at law or equity. Moreover, even<br />

if it could be said that a promise existed here, plaintiff’s action in reliance thereon<br />

constituted no detriment to him. At the time plaintiff was contacted by Ms. Leary, he<br />

was unemployed; he did not <strong>for</strong>ego continued employment. Although he moved from<br />

Chattanooga, Tennessee to St. Louis in order to commence his duties, he recovered<br />

judgment <strong>for</strong> his moving expenses in the court below. Finally, he was compensated at<br />

the “contractual” rate of $40,000 per year by the defendant through the time of his<br />

termination. Thus, adherence to the mandate of the Statute of Frauds would work no<br />

injustice. In Katz, it is said, “There are three elements to be satisfied to invoke the<br />

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. These are: (1) a promise; (2) a detrimental reliance<br />

on such promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by en<strong>for</strong>cement of the promise.”<br />

Plaintiff’s case is wanting in all three elements and is barred by the Statute of Frauds.<br />

In Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.<br />

App. 1961), plaintiff entered into an oral agreement whereby plaintiff would accept a<br />

managerial position in defendant’s business at $10,000 per year. Plaintiff was<br />

employed at the time; and, because he wanted to give his current employer one<br />

month’s notice of his resignation and take a week’s vacation be<strong>for</strong>e commencing his<br />

new job, it was agreed that he would start work thirty-seven days later. The evidence<br />

was in conflict as to whether the term of the contract was to be one year or <strong>for</strong> an<br />

indefinite period. Thereafter, plaintiff gave his notice, resigned and offered to start<br />

his new employment with defendant. Defendant, however, refused to allow him to<br />

start work, and plaintiff sought different employment. Plaintiff prevailed in the trial<br />

court, recovering damages <strong>for</strong> the time he was out of work, bonus lost by reason of his<br />

resignation, and expenses incurred in obtaining new employment.<br />

In reversing, the court held that, if the contract was <strong>for</strong> an indefinite period, it<br />

was terminable at will and the employer incurred no liability <strong>for</strong> not allowing the<br />

employee to start.<br />

The judgment is affirmed.<br />

______________________<br />

Review Question 5. The Mayer court notes that there were many details still<br />

to be settled about the contract, and suggests that if Mayer had disliked the final<br />

proffered contract, he could have “abandoned the relationship with impunity.” Wasn’t<br />

that also true of the plaintiff in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores? Are the facts of these two<br />

cases distinguishable or are the two courts acting inconsistently in their application<br />

of promissory estoppel doctrine?<br />

______________________<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

UNIT 9: PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS A CONSIDERATION SUBSTITUTE 167

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!