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American Contract Law for a Global Age, 2017a

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him to procure the per<strong>for</strong>mance by the defendant of the very act which the defendant<br />

promised to do, yet we are told that even after the plaintiff done all else which the<br />

defendant requested, the defendant’s promise was still not binding because the<br />

defendant chose not to per<strong>for</strong>m.<br />

I cannot believe that a result so extraordinary could have been intended when<br />

the defendant wrote the letter. “The thought behind the phrase proclaims itself<br />

misread when the outcome of the reading is injustice or absurdity.” Surace v. Danna,<br />

161 N.E. 315 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). If the defendant intended to induce payment<br />

by the plaintiff and yet reserve the right to refuse payment when offered he should<br />

have used a phrase better calculated to express his meaning than the words: “I agree<br />

to accept.” A promise to accept payment, by its very terms, must necessarily become<br />

binding, if at all, not later than when a present offer to pay is made.<br />

Under a fair construction of the words of the letter I think the plaintiff had<br />

done the act which the defendant requested as consideration <strong>for</strong> his promise. The<br />

plaintiff offered to pay with present intention and ability to make that payment.<br />

The judgment should be affirmed.<br />

______________________<br />

Review Question 2. The majority and the dissent in Petterson v. Pattberg do<br />

not appear to disagree about the underlying rules on revocation of an offer, yet they<br />

have very different characterizations of what the facts of the case actually mean <strong>for</strong><br />

purposes of applying those rules. See Restatement (Second) of <strong>Contract</strong>s §§ 35, 42.<br />

Whose reading of the facts and their legal meaning do you find more persuasive,<br />

Judge Kellogg’s majority opinion or Judge Lehman’s dissent? Why?<br />

______________________<br />

CONFEDERATE MOTORS, INC. v. TERNY<br />

United States District Court <strong>for</strong> the District of Massachusetts<br />

831 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Mass. 2011)<br />

JUDITH GAIL DEIN , U.S.M.J.<br />

This matter is be<strong>for</strong>e the court on Confederate Motors, Inc.’s “Motion to En<strong>for</strong>ce<br />

Settlement.” By this motion, Confederate contends that it reached a settlement<br />

agreement with the defendant, Francois-Xavier Terny, through attorney emails.<br />

Terny denies that a settlement had been reached.<br />

[Confederate Motors was an <strong>American</strong> custom motorcycle manufacturer,<br />

whose chair was Herbert Chambers. Francois-Xavier Terny, a financier, invested in<br />

Confederate, was named to its board, and signed a consulting agreement to help it<br />

______________________________________________________________________________<br />

UNIT 5: PROBLEMS WITH OFFERS 85

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