NEAFC 31st Annual Conference.pdf - New England Association of ...

NEW ENGLAND ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS
before you arrive. Most fire companies therefore confine their activities to preventing
the spread oft.he-flames, while hastening the extinguishment of the major conflagration
only through locating and = shutting off the proper control valves.
Precautions taken well in advance of pipe line trouble are by all odds the most
valuable, including:-
1. A thorough knowledge of ~he location of all high pressure lines and laterals
in your area: .....
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2. A knowledge of th~ location of the prcper valves for the isolation of any
section of the lines which might give trouble.
3. An. arrangement with the gas company whereby an authorizedt representative
will be available on short notice at any time. To be of any value to you, such
a man must have sufficient authority to take any action necessary, even to. that
of closing valves.
3. Plans for warning signs and even for the evacuation of an area whenever
there is (1) a line break of even a seemingly minor nature, (2) fire adjacent
to the right-of-way, (including brush or woods fires dangerously close to the
lines), (3) any signs of the remc.val of earth or other support from either
under or over the line, (4) any other signs of unusual disturbances that might
disturb the line to even the slightest extent.
.
Interruption of service is a serious matter to gas companies .because of the hazards
involved in resumption after the emergency has passed, as welt as for other reasons.
For this reason, they have been known to delay the closing of valves long after a real
emergency has developed. One such example occurred recently when the Chief of a
large city tire department was forced to standl and watch explosion after explosion
around him, including ofie which threw several firemen to the ground, while officials
of the two gas companies .ir~v~.!ved each argued that the other was responsible and
should thus shut his valves. Such-unfortunate situations should be worked out in advance
in the form of a definite plan of action to cover a line break at any point in the
State. " "
A classic example of a lack of such planning occurred recently in the vicinity of
Somerville, New Jersey. At.9:40 A. M. an alert police officer smelled gas, and upon
investigatior~ found a leak on a farm of such magnitude that it could be seen shimmering
in the sun: In the absence of local representatives, the police clerk was obliged
to call the contractor at Hartford, Connecticut, reaching him at 10:2~. He was instructed
to block off all nearby roads and wait. Nearly three hours later at 1:10 the
contracter’s representative phoned back that someone was being dispatched to the
scer.e from Suffern, New York and not to let anyone else near the leak. At 2:2~ this
man appeare:d, but evidently lacking authority to take any real action, he spent the
next hour phoning the Hartford principal, to tell him what the police had now known
for nearly five hours, that the leak was a bad one. At 3:40 another representative
appeared, and after seeing the seriousness of the leak, shut off the proper valves. At
4:40, just seven hours after its discovery, gas fl0w from the leak stopped and the
road blocks ~were removed.
Howeve..r: .the.t0o-sudden shutting of a valve ahead of a leak can also be hazardous.
With the pumping’ stations continuously forcing gas through the line, tegether with:
the inertia of the gas flowing at high pressure, such a sudden stoppage can cause a
second break ahead of the valv_e.. For this reason many gas company engineers look