Global Burden of Armed Violence - The Geneva Declaration on ...

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126 <strong>The</strong> violent death rate for aid workers is 60 per GLOBAL BURDEN <strong>of</strong> ARMED VIOLENCE Photo " Children in one <strong>of</strong> the slum areas in the centre <strong>of</strong> Kathmandu, Nepal. © Espen Rasmussen/ Panos Pictures 100,000 workers per year, and a considerable proportion <strong>of</strong> these killings are carried out using arms. <strong>The</strong> chapter seeks to enhance the understanding <strong>of</strong> other forms <strong>of</strong> armed violence around the world. It <strong>of</strong>fers a general overview <strong>of</strong> their different mani- festations and considers various risk factors that contribute to their onset and duration. <strong>The</strong> first section considers specific agents responsible for armed violence in urban and peri-urban areas. It focuses on the role <strong>of</strong> gangs, especially maras and pandillas in Central America, as symptoms <strong>of</strong> larger political, economic, and social processes. <strong>The</strong> second section focuses on extrajudicial violence and enforced disappearances, categories <strong>of</strong> illegitimate state-led violence that frequently are poorly recorded or ignored. It also considers kidnapping—a tactic adopted by armed groups, gangs, and common criminals alike—and another source and outcome <strong>of</strong> armed violence. <strong>The</strong> third section considers the incidence <strong>of</strong> armed violence against aid workers. <strong>Armed</strong> groups and gangs <strong>Armed</strong> groups—including rebels and organized gangs—do not emerge in a political vacuum. <strong>The</strong>y reflect a complex combination <strong>of</strong> economic and ideological interests. While certain groups report- edly mobilize out <strong>of</strong> greed or pr<strong>of</strong>it, researchers are discovering that motivations for recruitment are much more multifaceted than narrow monetary interest. 1 Although prospects for loot clearly provide a motivation for some, in many situations there are multiple factors that shape the resort to violence. For example, political elites may have long-established systems <strong>of</strong> personal rule and patronage, and may draw on armed groups to shore up their authority. Similarly, members <strong>of</strong> armed groups may join out <strong>of</strong> the more routine and pragmatic desire to protect their neighbour- hoods or communities from violence. <strong>Armed</strong> groups are highly heterogeneous and exhibit tremendous dynamism and enterprise. In some cases, members may be popularly described as ‘thugs’ or ‘bandits’, while in others they may be seen as heroes in their communities. Gang members may be viewed with apprehension, par- ticularly if recruits were forcibly removed from their families and social milieu. In situations where political institutions and public security providers suffer from weak governance, alternative forms <strong>of</strong> political authority and security delivery
will likely emerge. <strong>Armed</strong> groups may therefore be widely regarded as more legitimate than state institutions in the eyes <strong>of</strong> the community (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006; Moser, 2004). <strong>Armed</strong> groups are also frequently connected through power, patronage, and political affiliation. Groups include both formal and informal actors such as soldiers, police, paramilitaries, rebel groups, and ex-combatants and their dependents, together with mercenaries, militia groups, criminal and predatory gangs. Figure 7.1 presents a stylized typology <strong>of</strong> different types <strong>of</strong> organized armed groups and the ways in which they are potentially interlinked. In many cases, armed groups emerge in the context <strong>of</strong> a wider social crisis or malaise, itself potentially shaped by macroeconomic distortions and political disorder. <strong>Armed</strong> group members and their backers may coalesce as a reaction to social and economic exclusion rather than as a direct political project, as was the case <strong>of</strong> the Bakassi Boys or O’odua People’s Congress <strong>of</strong> Nigeria. Figure 7.1 A typology <strong>of</strong> armed groups and related actors <strong>Armed</strong> forces Military police and special forces Police and gendarmerie Source: Muggah and Jütersonke (forthcoming) ORGANIZED Likewise, the Mai Mai militia <strong>of</strong> the Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong> the Congo (DRC) and former diamond miners in Sierra Leone initially banded together to defend their communities from predation, though their motives changed over time (Weinstein, 2007). <strong>The</strong> domestic (and in some cases international) legitimacy bestowed on such groups is linked in large measure to their capacity to provide public goods such as security and services otherwise lacking to ordinary civilians (Muggah and Jütersonke, forthcoming). While not a new phenomenon, gangs are emerging as a major concern for policy-makers and practi- tioners around the world. Gangs are found in all societies, with the vast majority constituting little more than ephemeral groups <strong>of</strong> youth engaged in behaviour labelled ‘anti-social’ or ‘delinquent’. Gangs in the more formal sense are defined social organizations that display institutional continuity independent <strong>of</strong> their membership. <strong>The</strong>y exhibit fixed conventions and rules that may include, for example, initiation rites, ranking systems, induction Private security companies Rebels/gangs/vigilante groups Organized crime/mafia STATE SECURITY NON-STATE Paramilitaries/militia Paid informants SPONTANEOUS Political elites Commercial elites Religious leaders/faith-based groups 127 OT H E R FORMS OF A R M E D V I O L E N C E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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G L O B A L www.genevadeclaration.o
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G L O B A L www.genevadeclaration.o
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Foreword Armed vio
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Contents Executive Summary ........
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About the Geneva <
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of direct conflict
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Executive Summary Armed</st
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Figure 1 captures graphically the d
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This report also finds that the aft
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��
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Chapter One Direct Conflict Death <
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approaches that featured cross-nati
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us, non-state and intercommunal arm
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niques and inclusion requirements (
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Figure 1.2 Estimates of</st
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North Africa Sudan 7,284 1,098 2,60
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Map 1.1 The GBAV c
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�� Increasing di
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Table 1.4 Estimated direct conflict
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Table 1.7 Direct conflict death rat
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accounts overwhelmingly for the glo
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Chapter Two The Ma
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Sexual violence in armed conflict a
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continued for six months due to the
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Table 2.1 Comparison of</st
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of sexual violence
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can be explained by the relatively
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Box 2.3 A very dark number: direct
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Photo Victims of v
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Table 2.5 Violent death estimates f
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Chapter Three Armed</strong
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ized by a clear victory of<
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On the basis of Ch
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illegal war economies, including th
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standards issued by UNHCR emphasize
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Table 3.4 Risk factors for youth vi
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Map 3.2 The youth
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Given the potential importance <str
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interventions based on identified n
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Chapter Four Lethal Encounters: Non
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violence in Mexico in 2007-08 (BBC,
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comparisons between regions <strong
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tively. The Caribb
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Page 89 and 90: Table 4.1 National-level homicide t
Page 91 and 92: sistent increases during the time p
Page 93 and 94: Box 4.3 Sex, age, and armed violenc
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Page 99 and 100: evidence on the patterns and distri
Page 101 and 102: Chapter Five What’s in a Number?
Page 103 and 104: observe that war has negative effec
Page 105 and 106: Box 5.1 Accounting for the costs <s
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Page 109 and 110: Table 5.2 The soci
Page 111 and 112: In Uganda, a protracted armed confl
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Page 115 and 116: Figure 5.3 Potential gains in life
Page 117 and 118: playing a role in promoting an end
Page 119 and 120: 16 Specifically, the health and yea
Page 121 and 122: Chapter Six Armed
Page 123 and 124: (Myrttinen, 2003, p. 38). T
Page 125 and 126: NATO Forces and The</strong
Page 127 and 128: go missing, or are killed. In such
Page 129 and 130: disaggregated data is still not ava
Page 131 and 132: Acts of sexual vio
Page 133 and 134: Dowry-related violence A dowry is t
Page 135 and 136: sex ratios reported at birth is pre
Page 137: Chapter Seven Other Forms o
Page 141 and 142: Gangs in Central America Central Am
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Page 145 and 146: The absence <stron
Page 147 and 148: Table 7.1 Recorded cases of
Page 149 and 150: Figure 7.2 Kidnap for ransom cases
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Page 153 and 154: Bibliography Executive Summary CNP
Page 155 and 156: Burr, M. 1993. A Working Document:
Page 157 and 158: Thieren, Michael. 2005. ‘Health I
Page 159 and 160: ——. 2008. Small Arms Survey 200
Page 161 and 162: Nations-Survey-on-Crime-Trends-and-
Page 163 and 164: ground Paper. Geneva</stron
Page 165 and 166: --. 2003. ‘Masculinities and Masc
Page 167 and 168: ights-and-wrongs-of</strong
Page 169 and 170: Boxes List of Illu
Page 171 and 172: Map 4.1 Homicide rates per 100,000
Page 173 and 174: Figure 2.1 Typology of</str
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